E 403
.1
.S4 M53
Copy 2

FLM
2015
028066

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
00005027548

(PLEASE READ AND CIRCULATE.)

MEMOIR

OF

GENERAL SCOTT,

FROM RECORDS

COTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE EVENTS.

WASHINGTON:
C. ALEXANDER, PRINTER.
1852.

E4p3
S4M53
Copy2

MEMOIR

OF

GENERAL SCOTT,

FROM

RECORDS COTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE EVENTS.

A pictorial life of General Scott, which contains evidence on every page of being an autobiography prepared in advance of the Baltimore Convention, was thrown into circulation on the instant after his nomination. It was doubtless intended as much to control the decision of the nominating body, by private exhibition among its members, as subsequently to give impulse to the military campaign into which it was resolved to convert the presidential election. The life is illustrated with two dozen wood-cuts, displaying as many scenes in which the General is always presented a giant among pigmies—a Gulliver in Lilliput—and the story as told is in perfect keeping with the disproportions of the pictures. An enormous vanity, looking through a long and dim vista reaching back forty years, turns all associates in the remote distance into mere atoms, while by appropriating what belonged to them it swells itself to the dimensions of the fabulous Titan. General Scott's egotism, as it appears in his autobiography, has grown great like Aaron's serpent. His reputation has in his commentaries swallowed up the glory of every other man who figured in our military annals.

It is due to the illustrious dead—to Brown, the self-taught quaker Pennsylvanian, who first turned the tide of battle in our favor in the North, at Sackett's Harbor, with the hastily gathered militia of the neighborhood—who stepped from his farm to the head of that newly recruited army which carried out his glorious conception of the Niagara campaign, and who like Jackson, another militia General, humbled the veteran invincibles of Wellington beneath the blows of a citizen soldiery of half their numbers—it is due to Pike, to Ripley, to Brady, to Leavenworth, to McNeill, to Miller, to Van Rensellaer, to Christie, Wadsworth, to Wool, Dearborn, Lewis, Chauncey, Gaines, Macomb, and Jackson, of the war of 1812—to Taylor, Worth, Duncan, the injured dead of the last war, to vindicate their fame from the disparagement attempted by General Scott, prompted by envy, and urged on by ambition. The few surviving associates of the gallant soldiers whom Scott has insidiously sought to injure, and who have experienced at his hands the same ungenerous treatment, are living witnesses of the wrong which the record will, when adduced, expose.

Generals Towson and Jesup are the sole survivors of the distinguished field officers with Scott, when he fought under Brown in the brilliant Niagara campaign. They cannot but look with disgust on the book blazoned with pictures got up by General Scott, for electioneering purposes, and in which he every where struts the chief, when he was in every sense the subordinate.

It is a marked trait in Scott's career, that he hated all his superiors in grade, and that no man whose distinguished services in any station rendered him a rival in Scott's eye, ever escaped his envy, or failed to feel the effects of his sinister attempts, openly or covertly, made on the high reputations they had earned.

Wilkinson and Scott.

General Wilkinson was the first to suffer from Scott's unhappy propensity to decry superiors. In 1814, a memoir of General Scott, (gotten up by himself, as Gen. Wilkinson alleges,) abuses the latter as the author of the charges on which he, Scott, was convicted and suspended in 1809. Wilkinson shows that this was false by record evidence;—gives an account of his relations with Scott from the day when, as a young Captain, the latter joined his army on the Mississippi. Scott had written an abusive letter against him on the way to New Orleans, in consequence of Captain Bankhead being placed over him in command, on the transports which conveyed their companies. On his arrival at New Orleans, Scott thus introduced himself, says Wilkinson: "*It is probable General you may have heard of my having written a free letter to you, in which, under a false impression, I took liberty with you, which I now regret.*" "I had received," continues Wilkinson, "no such letter, and interrupted him by observing that my ears were not open to informers, and that the acknowledgment of an error was all that a liberal mind could desire." Scott had suppressed the abusive letter, and after having read it to others, took this mode of preventing its injurious effects to himself through rumors reaching the General. He took the oc-

casion which the kind feeling produced by his frank apology, to solicit a furlough from the General to return to Virginia, telling him, says Wilkinson, that there was an "*obligation which imperiously required his presence in Virginia, and that I might readily conceive what delicacy forbid his mentioning.*" Wilkinson indulged him. After Scott had left the army, stating that he would resign and not return, Lieut. J. H. T. Estes, of Virginia, addressed the following note to General Wilkinson, to be forwarded to the War Department.

"Camp Terre Bœuf, *July* 9, 1810."

"Sir:—Captain Winfield Scott having left the service of the United States, and I being the oldest officer in his absence, have had frequent applications from the greater part of the men now under my command for two months' pay due them, to wit: September and October, 1808, which money I know that Captain Scott received at Richmond, and has not accounted to the men for, and herein enclose a Pay Roll, made out by Capt. W. Scott, for September and October, with the affidavit of the men present, that they have not received their money from him for the above mentioned time; and I do certify that the remarks made by me on the Pay Roll opposite their names are accurate and just to the best of my knowledge.

I am respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN H. T. ESTES.

General Wilkinson."

Dr. Upshaw, of Virginia, had been involved in a quarrel by Scott before he left New Orleans. A challenge passed, but the illness of Upshaw up to the time when Scott left, prevented a meeting. When Upshaw heard of Estes's statement, he pronounced Scott's retaining of the men's pay a robbery. He presented charges against Scott before a Court Martial, after Wilkinson was superseded in the command of the army by Hampton. The charges were:

1. "For drawing two months of his company's pay, and withholding it from his men."
2. "For seditious and insubordinate language respecting the Commanding General, declaring that if he should go into the field with him, he would carry one pistol for the enemy, and one for the General."

Upshaw prosecuted the charges, against the earnest solicitations of Wilkinson to desist,—the latter desiring to suppress a feud which at last ended in a duel in which Upshaw wounded Scott. The judgment of the Court was as follows:

"After due deliberation, &c., the Court find the prisoner guilty of the first charge, but acquit him of fraudulent intentions—And of the second charge of speaking disrespectfully of the Commanding General; but not of the words charged—and sentence him to one year's suspension from rank, pay and emoluments."

Wilkinson, in his further detail of his relations with Scott, shows that Scott never forgave him, although the injured party, and one who still strove to save him from the difficulties in which he involved himself. When Wilkinson was put in command over him in 1813, in the North, Scott (then Colonel) again approached the General in the same way as at New Orleans, and the latter again waived all explanations—told him he "*was ready to consign all to oblivion;*" and afterwards gave him opportunities which he says "*excited the jealousy and discontent of senior Colonels in the camp,*" and was finally repaid for all his forbearance and kindness, when he was broken down by ill health and misfortune, by ingratitude and treachery. After Wilkinson's unlucky campaign, Scott came to his sick room, and there, says Wilkinson, "*He pressed my feeble helpless hand, and when I complained of my hard fortune, he affected to pour balm into my afflicted bosom by assuring me that although his relations with General Hampton would prevent his saying anything against that officer, my conduct should be placed on its proper ground, and that he would vindicate it against censure.*"

"With these professions on his lips, which the Father of mercies can witness were made to me by Colonel Scott, he arrives at Albany, and there discovering that the Secretary of War had determined to make me the scapegoat for the failure of the campaign, he yields to his secret hatred of a man whom he had too deeply injured to forgive, and forgetting my treatment of him, and his own voluntary promises, he outstrips the perfidy on the Mississippi, and, as I have been informed, and do verily believe, attempted in whispers to blast my character by imputing to me the beastly crime of drunkenness, at a time I labored under a disease that menaced my life." This charge was brought against Wilkinson, on which (as well as all the other charges for which he was tried) he was acquitted; and he dismisses his account of Scott's various attacks on him by summing up his character in these words, "*A noisy Democrat—a silent Federalist—a subtle tyrant, who would sooner reign in hell than serve in Heaven.*" This was in 1817. Whether there is any truth in this severe opinion pronounced by an exasperated man, the public will decide, from the history of Scott's conduct towards all others associated with him in public life—a history gleaned from public documents.

Gen. Jackson and Gen. Scott.

Gen. Jackson, another superior officer, became obnoxious to Gen. Scott's envy and hostility. His exploits in the war of 1812, and his chastisement of the Spanish Florida Authority, and the British Brigands operating through the Seminoles, who spread havoc along our helpless Southern frontier in 1817, had excited against General Jackson the jealousy of all the aspirants for the Presidency, civil and military. The civilians assailed Jackson in Congress. General Scott charged him in his conversations in city circles and military coteries with *mutiny*, for issuing a general order declaring that commands to his inferior officers must be made through him. General Jackson was informed, by an anonymous letter from New York, of these attacks. He did not credit the letter, but wrote Scott a frank note, enclosing a copy of it to him, and concluded by saying,

"*I have not permitted myself for a moment to believe that the conduct ascribed to you is correct. Candor, however, induces me to lay them before you, that you may have it in your power to say how far they be correctly stated.*"

General Scott replied in an elaborate argument to support his charge before the public, (for his letter was afterwards circulated in pamphlet.)

He could not deny but that if a commanding General had his officers, and portions of his army on special service under him, ordered elsewhere without his knowledge, that it might be alike fatal to him and to the public interest committed to his charge. Nevertheless, by way of bearding General Jackson, and impressing the charge against him of being a MUTINEER, Scott adds (while admitting the sound reason of Jackson's orders) that "*a private and respectful remonstrance, therefore, appears to have been the only mode of redress which circumstances admitted of. An appeal to the army, or the public, before or after such remonstrance, seems to have been a greater irregularity than the measure complained of—to reprobate that measure publicly as the division order does, was to mount still higher in the scale of indecorum, but when the order goes so far as to prohibit to all officers in the division, an obedience to the commands of the President of the United States, unless received through division Head Quarters, it appears to me that* NOTHING BUT MUTINY AND DEFIANCE CAN BE UNDERSTOOD OR INTENDED."

In thus throwing down the gauntlet to Gen. Jackson, the champion forgot that he was not dealing with General Wilkinson. Jackson took it up, resolved to bring it to a decisive arbitrament, or, at least, to give a new schooling to Scott in his military deportment and moral principles.

He asks Scott, in reply—

"Pray, sir, does your recollection serve? In what school of Philosophy were you taught that to a letter inquiring into the nature of a supposed injury, clothed in language decorous and unexceptionable, an answer should be given, couched in pompous insolence and bullying expression? I had hoped that what was charged upon you by an anonymous correspondent was unfounded: I hoped so, from the belief that General Scott was a soldier and a gentleman; but when I see these statements directly confirmed by his own words, it becomes a matter of inquiry how far a man of honorable feelings can reconcile them to himself longer to set up a claim to that character. Are you ignorant, sir, that had my order, at which your refined judgment is so extremely touched, been made the subject of inquiry, you might, from your standing, not your character, have been constituted one of my Judges? How very proper then was it, thus situated, and without any knowledge of any of the attendant circumstances, for you to have prejudged the whole matter? This at different times, and in the circle of your friends, you could do; and yet had I been arraigned, and you detailed as one of my judges, with the designs of an assassin lurking under a fair exterior, you would have approached the holy sanctuary of justice. Is conduct like this, congenial with that high sense of dignity that should be seated in a soldier's bosom? Is it due from a brother officer, to assail in the dark the reputation of another, and stab him at a moment when he cannot expect it? I might insult an honorable man by questions such as these, but shall not expect that they will harrow up one, who must be dead to all those feelings that are the characteristics of a gentleman."

And after presenting in still stronger lights "*the abominable crime of detraction—of slandering behind his back a brother officer,*" the letter concludes thus :—

"My notions, sir, are not those now taught in modern schools and in fashionable high life; they were imbibed in ancient days, and hitherto have, and yet bear me to the conclusion, that he that can wantonly outrage the feelings of another—can intend injury where none is due—is capable of any crime however detestable in its nature, and will not fail to commit it, whenever it may be imposed by necessity.

"I shall not stoop, sir, to a justification of my order before you, or to notice the weakness and absurdity of your tinsel rhetoric; it may be quite conclusive with yourself, and I have no disposition to attempt convincing you, that your ingenuity is not as profound as you have imagined it to be. To my Government, whenever it may please, I hold myself liable to answer, and to prove the reasons which prompted me to the course I took; and to the intermeddling pimps and spies of the War Department, who are in the garb of gentlemen, I hold myself responsible for any grievance they may labor under on my account, with whom you have my permission to number yourself. For what I have said I offer no apology; you have deserved it all and more, were it necessary to say more. I will barely remark, in conclusion, that if you feel yourself aggrieved at what is here said, any communication from you will reach me safely at this place.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, ANDREW JACKSON.

On this letter, Scott's pamphlet (which is republished in Niles's Register, page 126, Vol. XVI.) thus remarks :

"The foregoing extraordinary letter was laid aside until almost forgotten. When certain of his feelings Gen. Scott sat down to reply to it. He thought of New Orleans and some other affairs in which the parties had been respectively engaged, and it appeared to him that a brace of pistols would add nothing to the character of either. He conceived that at the age he had then attained, some little reputation for temper and moderation began to be an object worthy of his consideration, however they might be disregarded by his opponent."

The Pamphlet argues this moral theme to some extent, and then changes the topic thus—

"But the foregoing letter has been represented as a challenge, and the reply to it, a non-acceptance on the ground of religious scruples. The double falsehood will not escape the reader, although it be true that Gen. Scott in *a playful humor* chose to treat the letter as a challenge."

He then gives the letter (which he would have the reader consider one of "*playful humor,*") in reply to Gen. Jackson's, received 22d December, and which was laid aside and almost forgotten in 10 days!!

"HEAD QUARTERS, 1st AND 3d MILITARY DEPTS.,
New York, June 2, 1818.

"SIR: Your letter of 3d ult. was handed me about 22d ult., and has not been *read*, I might say *thought of* since.

"These circumstances will show that it is my wish to reply to you dispassionately.

"I regret that I cannot accept the challenge you offer. Perhaps I may be restrained from wishing to level a pistol at the breast of a fellow being in private combat by a sense of religion, but lest this motive should excite the ridicule of gentlemen of liberal habits of thinking and acting, I beg leave to add that I decline the honor of your invitation from patriotic scruples. My ambition is not that of Erostratus. I should think it would be easy to console yourself by the application of a few epithets as coward, &c., to the object of your resentment, and I here promise to leave you until the next war to persuade yourself of their truth.

"Your famous order bears date"—Here Gen'l Scott runs off into a discussion of that which Gen'l Jackson refused to discuss with him. He touches the topic with much more tenderness than before, and with a variety of personal compliments; concluding thus—

"I cannot close this letter without expressing a belief that on the return of your wonted magnanimity, I shall be requested to burn the one which has elicited it, by way of apology for the injury it does me—accordingly it has been seen but by one individual, (of my staff,) and shall be held in reserve, until a certain time has elapsed attending that just expectation.

"In the mean time I have the honor to remain,
Sir, very respectfully, your obedient,
W. SCOTT."

It is evident that General Jackson did not intend his letter for a challenge ; he intended it for an insult. Gen. Scott had a right to charge him with mutiny if he pleased—to have him tried for it without affording Gen'l Jackson ground for a challenge. But his manner of accusing him in the circles of the cities in which he moved, thus trying to destroy Gen'l Jackson's reputation insidiously, without putting him on his defence, was a provocation which justified the insult. The close of Gen. Jackson's letter shows that he expected a challenge from Scott, who warily avoided the attitude in which the controversy placed him by pretending that he was the challenged party. If he had even replied in the spirit of Gen'l Jackson's letter without challenging, it would have been an earnest, that whilst provoking a challenge he would meet it. He escaped the whole difficulty, as he supposed, by choosing to treat the letter as a challenge in a playful humor and declining it from "a sense of religion!" This, he thought, would give a double face to the affair ; enable him to say that it was a double falsehood to represent the letter sent him as "a challenge, and the reply to it a non-acceptance on the ground of religious scruples." And he had a hope that by concluding his letter with an appeal to Gen. Jackson's wonted magnanimity, to "burn the one that elicited it," the whole thing, if he succeeded in his scheme, would pass over quietly and in secret. But Gen. Jackson was not a man for child's play in matters that affected his reputation. He had the magnanimity to disappoint Scott in his fear of the application of such epithets as "coward," &c., but he had not the magnanimity to burn the paper in which he resented and repelled the attack on his military fame.

Dewitt Clinton.

The attack on Gen. Jackson having rather an unpromising look, Scott in his last letter evinced a desire to turn his battery on one who, he felt, was not so difficult to deal with as Jackson. He says to Gen'l Jackson :

"Permit me to request—I think I have a right to demand—a sight of the *original* anonymous letter, which has given rise to this discussion. If I mistake not, your correspondent is perhaps a greater personage than you imagine—nay, so high that he has once essayed to set himself above the highest in our political sphere. The letter shall be returned as soon as the hand is compared with that of a certain agent of the personage alluded to."

Gen. Jackson did not lend himself to this scheme of hunting up a new quarrel. It did not accord with his old-school notions, to betray a correspondent who had written him the truth. Scott in his pamphlet (republished in Niles's Register) says : "No reply was ever made to the foregoing, and of course Gen'l Scott has never seen the original anonymous letter. His suspicions and the whole correspondence were fully communicated in January, 1818, to a particular friend of Governor Clinton, who was perfectly at liberty to give notice thereof to that personage." The pamphlet containing this passage, as soon as it reached Gov. Clinton, called forth this notice :

TO THE PUBLIC.

"General Scott, of the Army of the United States, having in a letter to General Jackson, of the 2d of January, insinuated that I had written, dictated, or instigated an anonymous letter to the latter gentleman from unworthy motives, or for improper purposes ; and having also concealed this imputation from me, until the publication of a pamphlet which reached me on the 4th instant, I have considered it proper to declare, that I have had no agency in writing, dictating, or instigating any anonymous letter whatever to Gen. Jackson ; that I am entirely ignorant of the author, and that the intimation of Gen. Scott is entirely and unqualifiedly false, to all intents and in all respects. This declaration is made from motives of respect to public opinion, and not from any regard for Gen. Scott, whose conduct on this occasion is such a total departure from honor and propriety as to render him unworthy of the esteem of a man who has any respect for himself.

It is not probable that I can at this time have any recollection of having had the honor of seeing Gen. Scott on the 9th June, 1817, at a dinner in New York, or of the topics of conversation, as he suggests ; circumstances so unimportant are not apt to be impressed on the memory. But I feel a confident persuasion that I did not make use of any expressions incompatible with the high respect which I entertain for General Jackson.

DEWITT CLINTON."

Albany, 6th April, 1819."

Gen'l Scott took this notice in so *serious a humor* that he forgot his *sense of religion*, and challenged Gov. Clinton to private combat, and Governor Clinton treated it with the scorn it deserved.

Scott's Injustice to Brown, Pike, Ripley, Jesup, Brady, McNeill, Miller, &c.

How strikingly does this more recent evidence of a jealous rivalry sacrificing every thing to a selfish ambition, reflect its light backwards, on Scott's conduct to his comrades in the Niagara campaign of 1814, and develop the motives which prompted the injustice still done them in his newly published autobiography! Never was there such an instance of unfair dealing on the part of any man towards those to whom he is indebted for his reputation, as is exhibited by Scott in the work just put forth to blazon his exploits. If he could deny that it is written by his own hand or under his dictation, the simple fact, that he allows the circulation of unfair fabrications to subserve his interests, and with the sanction of his silent consent, makes him accessory to the wrong perpetrated against his companions in arms, for the most part precluded (the grave having closed over them) from vindicating their fame, but which will be repelled by every surviving witness of the glorious scenes from which Scott's biography excludes every prominent actor but himself.

The autobiography begins the celebrated Niagara campaign, under this heading : "*Scott organizes an army.*" And after assuming that he had everything under his command—that he had "the no less important duty to perform than to organize, discipline, and instruct an army of new recruits then being mustered into the service, &c."—that "we had heretofore used the Prussian system of tactics, Scott introduced at once, the far more perfect French system, &c.;" concluding with the self-complacent, self satisfying remark, that he had taken in hand a body of

raw militia without drill and without experience, and at the end of three months had converted them into a well disciplined and invincible corps, which soon showed itself able to conquer the renowned veterans of Wellington himself.

Here is a detraction which robs some of the noblest names of our military annals of their just fame. General Pike was the first to introduce the tactics and discipline of modern France into the American army. The hero who fell at York was the man who had previously created the model regiment of our service, and General Brown, who commanded in chief on the Niagara frontier, was the man who organized the army to which he was appointed, and *he* planned and executed in person the operations of the campaign which covered that army with ever living laurels.

The first step of the invasion of Canada was the summons of Fort Erie Ingersoll, in his history, says: "Major Jesup was ordered forward with the 25th Infantry to invest the fort in conjunction with Ripley's Brigade, which had not reached the station assigned to it. With Majors McCrea and Wood, he approached and reconnoitered the fort, which delivered some discharges from both cannon and musketry, wounding a few of Jesup's men. Investing Fort Erie with his two brigades, Brown's good fortune commenced by its capitulation, &c." Gen. Scott, in his autobiography, takes the whole credit of this auspicious opening affair. It says: "Scott led the van. Fort Erie surrendered at discretion." He takes Brown's plans and Jesup's execution as his own, and Cæsar's *veni, vidi, vici*, for the model of his narrative; but he should have remembered that Cæsar's brevity owed its force to its truth.

The next step in the "Life of General Scott," brings us to Chippewa, and here is an account of it as embodied in himself, and made part of his life:

"The British were a well-tried and hitherto conquering soldiery, possessing the advantage of a decided superiority of numbers, and the prestige of invincibility. But the daring and zealous young American general courted the unequal strife. Filled with martial ardor, and an uncalculating intrepidity, that only sought the opportunity to wipe out the memory of previous disaster and imbecility, and to exalt the glory of his country, he mailed himself for the conflict. His hopes beat high in the confidence of a spirit that felt determined to wrest reluctant victory from its favorite standard. In this hardy temper of soul he led forth his troops upon the plain. The British commander, in full reliance upon the invincibility of his men, anticipated his antagonist's determination, and came forth to meet him. The day had passed in skirmishes. At five o'clock in the afternoon the combatants drew up in battle array. The Americans coolly and steadily advanced in line, stretching across the plain from the river to the wood. The British force, in similar order, supported by a battery of nine cannon, confronted our ranks. The attack was simultaneous and vehement on both sides, along the whole line. The hostile armies, under a destructive fire, continued to approach until they were within eighty yards of one another, each manifesting the utmost coolness and most determined courage. Shoulder to shoulder the American troops advanced, bravely meeting and falling before the iron tempest hurled in their faces by the steady masses of the practiced foe. The young and gallant leader was everywhere along the line encouraging and animating his troops, and displaying an activity, an enthusiasm, and a fearless disregard of danger, that inspired and electrified his little army. While the battle raged in yet uncertain fury, the British line was observed to become in a measure broken, in consequence of its right wing having been retarded in its advance by the wood, where it had come into conflict with Jesup's battalion. Scott seized upon the favorable moment with the eye of a veteran general, and by a skilful military manœuvre directed the whole force of his attack upon the now weakened centre of the enemy. The swiftness and fierceness of this movement, backed by a murderous fire of our artillery, caused the enemy's line to waver. At this critical moment he gave the order to 'to charge bayonet!' The onset was terrible. The British columns were borne down and crushed by the irresistible vigor of this desperate assault. They broke and fled in confusion, amid terrible slaughter. Scott followed up his advantage with masterly activity, and pursued his routed adversary over the plain into his intrenchments."

Now the reader will observe that this whole battle scene is filled up with "the daring and zealous young American General"—"with his martial ardor and uncalculating intrepidity"—"who mailed himself for the conflict to wipe out previous disaster and imbecility, and to exalt the glory of his country!!" And here he tells us of "the hopes which animated his bosom. *His hopes beat high in the confidence of a spirit that felt determined to wrest reluctant victory from its favorite standard. In this hardy temper of soul he led forth his troops upon the plain.*"

Why should General Scott make such a preliminary parade about his secret emotions? He carried his brigade gallantly into action, and why not let that fact speak for his courage? And why, after all this excelling heroism is displayed, does he forget to say one word of the commanding General Brown, who was on the field directing everything, or of the conduct of the other officers whose separate corps coolly struck the blows that put the enemy to flight? Instead of doing this, he parades his courage again as that which electrified the whole field and sufficed for the whole army. "*The young and gallant leader was everywhere along the line, encouraging and animating his troops, displaying an activity, an enthusiasm and a fearless disregard of danger that inspired and electrified his little army.*" Doubtless General Scott did his duty valiantly, but he forgets that it was not "*his* little army," but Gen. Brown's, and he forgets that it was bayonets led by Jesup, (not by the direction of Scott) who perceived the favorable moment with the eye of a skilful General and improved it, on his own motion; and that it was his (Jesup's) and McNeill's admirable manœuvers enabling them to pour their fire on the front and rear of the enemy, that decided the battle. Compare the account of the action as given by the Secretary of War, General Armstrong, from the official reports, with that taken from the "Life of Scott."

"The hostile armies being now but about one mile and a half apart, their pickets were found soon after day-break engaged in skirmishing—a mode of warfare little adapted to Brown's views, and one he was desirous of terminating in a way which should prevent his adversary from making a second experiment of it. To this end, while he directed his outlying guards to feign a flight, and thus draw those of the enemy into a pursuit, he detached Brigadier Porter, of the New York militia, with a light corps, to march rapidly under cover of an adjoining wood and throw himself between the British skirmishing party and their main body."

In executing this order, Porter fell in with an outpost or patrol of the enemy, which, after a combat of short duration, he routed and was actively pursuing, when, on debouching from the wood he unexpectedly found himself in the presence of a heavy British column. We need scarcely add, that his retreat was necessarily sudden and rapid, and not discontinued until he reached the American camp.

"Though the intended manœuvre thus failed to produce the effect expected from it, it fortunately became the cause of another, of a character much more important - that of drawing the British General and army from their fortified camp. Alarmed by the firing on his right, for the safety of his outlying party, and suspecting that Brown, while amusing him with a *petite guerre*, in his front, really meditated an attack on his flank. Riall hastened to assemble his whole disposable force, and take a position on the plain, which would better enable him to sustain his outposts and hold in check any formidable movement attempted by his adversary. The execution of this purpose did not escape the notice of the American General, who quickly seized the occasion it offered for bringing his enemy to battle on open ground, where it was justly concluded, he would be more easily beaten than if posted behind his entrenchments. Scott was accordingly ordered to cross the bridge in his front, and with his brigade and Towson's artillery to attack Riall's left—while Ripley, with the second brigade and Hindman's artillery should assail his right and rear.

"The former of these corps being already under arms in the exercise of its customary drill, was soon in motion—when its commander, suspecting from the detour necessary to Ripley's movement, that the two attacks could not be made simultaneously, and inferring from the extended front of the enemy, that the first brigade would be greatly outflanked, promptly ordered Major Jesup, commanding the 25th regiment, to throw himself forward and give such employment to Riall's right, as would prevent it from disturbing the attack about to be made on his left.—This order was quickly executed, and the 25th placed at the short distance of one hundred yards from the British élite; which had in the mean time been careful to cover its front with a log fence. The action soon commenced in parallel order, and was maintained with steadiness on both sides; when Jesup perceiving from the fire of the covered enemy in front, and his great liability to a flank attack from a body of Indian and Canadian militia collected on his left, that the position he had taken would not long be tenable, gallantly determined to try the effect of the bayonet. A charge was accordingly ordered, and executed with its usual success; as the enemy declining to receive it, abandoned his position and fled in disorder.

"The Major being now in a condition to take part in the main action (yet warmly contested) hastened to place his regiment across the uncovered flank of what remained of Riall's line; and by an oblique fire on both its front and rear, was soon enabled to put another portion of it to flight. It was at the moment of this occurrence, that the commanding General arrived on the field, bringing with him assurances of speedy support from the second brigade—a circumstance not even now unwelcome, but of greatly diminished interest to the gallant men of the 1st, in as much as a flank movement then making [by the 11th] under the direction of Major McNeill, combined with Scott's pressure in front, was sufficient to terminate the battle, and compel the enemy to withdraw behind his entrenchments."

Ingersoll in his History of the War, gives the following account of the decisive crisis in this battle, which Jesup turned to victory:

"The enemy considerably outnumbering, outflanked Scott's line, and might have turned it, but for one of those inspired movements which change a perilous crisis into greater safety and assurance, by the near approach of danger. Major Jesup, at the head of the 25th regiment, (whose horse was shot under him, and his men falling fast on the extreme left, where he contended with the British right,) ordered his firing to be suspended, and his regiment to advance with the bayonet, in the teeth of deadly volleys, gained thereby a favorable position, and compelling their adversaries to retire from a log fence, behind which they stood. But driven back by Jesup's gallant charge, exposed to flank as well as to front fire, Major McNeill on the right, Major Leavenworth parallel to the enemy's attack, meanwhile poured in their rapid and destructive fire, McNeill judiciously occupied an oblique position, and delivered his well aimed shots with fatal effect; and though Captain Towson's own gun was thrown out of action, he served with unabated ardor at the other pieces. Captain Harris, of the dragoons, (which corps was not made use of,) volunteered to serve out of his place, and had his horse shot under him. Major Wood, of the Engineers, also served as a volunteer. Colonel Campbell, the only officer disabled, was wounded as he led the 11th regiment into action. While it was raging, General Brown arrived and cheered the first brigade, with the assurance that the second would soon come to its aid, which in killed and wounded had lost a fourth of its numbers, yet unshrinkingly continued the action alone."

Here, although Scott's brigade alone, assisted by Porter's volunteers, fought the battle, yet Brown made all the arrangements that preceded it. General Jesup, (as quoted by Ingersoll,) says, that General Brown ordered General Porter "to place himself between the enemy's advance and his main body. To facilitate this object, our advance pickets were ordered to provoke a fire from the enemy's pickets, and then to fall back to some log cabins in front of Street's House, to induce them to follow, and draw, if possible, their light troops to follow in that direction. A heavy firing soon commenced, and continued for more than half an hour, when the enemy's light troops were observed to be retiring, and from a cloud of dust seen rising in the road leading to Chippewa Bridge, it was evident Riall was in motion with his principal force, and that he had attempted with his light troops a similar ruse upon us to that which General Brown had attempted upon him. At the time the firing had become so heavy, Major Jesup ordered the 25th to be ready to move at a moment's notice, and mounting his horse, he crossed the creek and joined General Brown. When the movement of Riall was perceived, he returned immediately to his place and found the regiment forming under arms, by order of General Scott, for exercise; (up to this time Scott had not been in battle;) a few moments after the order was given by General Brown to march and meet the enemy."

Here we see Brown executing in person, all the manœuvers that brought the British general out of his entrenched camp—ordering the battle—hastening on reinforcements, and before they could get up, flinging himself into the battle where raging, to encourage the troops to maintain it. Yet Scott, his second in command, would, in his Biography, lead to the belief that there was no such man as Brown, the General-in-Chief, at Chippewa; and he equally forgets Porter, Campbell, Leavenworth, McNeill, Harris, Towson, Wood—all the gallant chiefs under him, who fought the battle, and he only mentions Jesup's name to make the impression that he ordered his decisive charge with the bayonet—a charge which Jesup made on his own responsibility, without an order from Scott, and without his knowledge, until its success had made it apparent.

The next step in the Biography, is LUNDY'S LANE, and as it is the great battle which is relied on by Scott and his friends to close their presidential campaign with victory, not a word of their narrative should pass without due consideration.

"Finding himself, 'the Biography says,' thus surprised into a battle against such enormous odds, he might well have determined to retire and await the arrival of reinforcements under General Brown, before going into action. But with undaunted purpose he resolved to stand his ground. He however immediately dispatched an aid to General Brown requesting him to hasten to his assistance. It was now six o'clock in the afternoon. The quick eye

of Scott discovering the opportunity, he immediately ordered General Jesup's battallion to turn the enemy's flank. Under cover of about 200 yards of under growth, which concealed the operation, Jesup accomplished his object in a brilliant manner, and not only cut off the left wing of the enemy, but triumphantly broke through their ranks, and returned into line, bearing off Major General Riall and some other British officers prisoners The enemy, outflanking our troops on the right, made a powerful attempt, backed by murderous discharges of cannon, and favored by superior numbers, to turn our position.—General Scott perceiving the attempt, and intent upon foiling so threatening a movement, dispatched McNeill's battalion to repulse the enemy. A most obstinate conflict, conducted upon both sides with great vehemence, followed. The assailants recoiled, and were punished with dreadful severity. Meantime the main battle of the two centres had joined and fought with great fierceness. The American line sustained with unshaken valor the whole weight of the enemy's superior numbers now precipitated upon them with a fiery impetuosity. Our gallant band, though suffering prodigiously, displayed unconquerable resolution. The commanding presence and heroic example of their intrepid commander, who regardless of all peril, with unwearied vigor, was foremost in every post of danger, nerved them to unparalleled efforts. The battalions of Scott on this occasion, before he was succored by General Brown, were dreadfully cut up. Night came on, and beneath the uncertain light of the moon, wading deep through the broken clouds, the desperate strife was continued. General Scott had had two horses killed under him, and been wounded in the side by a bullet. But in nowise subdued, he rushed into the contest on foot, and continued to the end in the thickest of the fight.

The British infantry continued to pour their deadly fire upon our weakened ranks, and their artillery, posted in a commanding position, on the crest of a neighboring height, which commanded the whole field of battle, at every discharge, thundered death upon our devoted columns. At length, at nine o'clock at night, after three hours of this deadly struggle on the part of General Scott, General Brown arrived upon the ground with his reinforcement.—The enemy which, with vastly superior numbers, had barely withstood the determined bravery of General Scott's little army, and only maintained itself in the centre under the guns of the artillery, was now obliged to yield. The regiment of the heroic Miller was deputed to the perilous service of silencing the British battery on the heights. General Scott volunteered to lead the way, and did so, through the darkness, up to the point of attack.—He then returned to favor Miller's movement, and made another onset upon the British line, in which his battalion suffered even more than before. After a series of desperate hand to hand encounters, Miller was successful, and the batteries were silenced.

Under the renewed furious charge of our troops the enemy were now forced to retire, and abandon the field to the Americans. In one of the last of these charges, just at the close of the action amid terrible fighting, Scott was severely wounded, and had to be borne from the field.—This engagement incontestably established the bravery of our troops, and the reputation of General Scott as an officer."

In this picture Scott is made not merely the principal figure, but the only important personage on the scene. Brown, the commander-in-chief, whose camp was not three miles from the field, and who mounted and rode to it as soon as the firing was heard, met the express sent by Scott to him for aid—who brought up the second brigade and interposed it between Scott and the British line, throwing Scott in the rear as the reserve—who saw the insurmountable obstacle to success in the enemy's battery, which had not been attacked by Scott, and should have been—who ordered it to be stormed—took it, and reformed the whole line of battle in front—repelled the enemy's succession of charges, and finally drove him from the field, after Scott had again entered with his reserve, and had been defeated in his charge—this bold, active, skilful chief, who was in every part of the battle, and although shot through the thigh and in the side, never left it until it was won, is, in Scott's sketch, nowhere to be found. But the Secretary of War, Armstrong, however favorable to Scott, shows, from the Report of all the officers engaged, how the victory was achieved. This is a contemporary notice of the event.

Extract from Armstrong's Notes of the War of 1812, vol. II:

"Intelligence like this, stating a movement on the part of the enemy, so probable in itself, so favorable to him, so menacing to us, and so entirely out of Brown's power to interrupt directly, could not fail to disquiet that officer—who, notwithstanding, lost no time in adopting the only measure of counteraction left him—that of a rapid march on the enemy's post, in the hope that to secure these, he would probably recall the detachment sent, as was conjectured, against Schlosser"

"It was in executing this measure, that Scott, to whom the service was assigned, after a short march of two miles, discovered a party of British infantry near the great falls, which fell back slowly on his approach. On reaching Willow's Inn, the brigadier was further informed that 'Riall lay directly in his front, and was but separated from him by a narrow wood, intending (as was reported) to attack Brown's camp at day-break the ensuing morning.' A messenger being despatched to headquarters with information, Scott, from the urgency of the case which had put him in motion, and the spirit of the orders given him, concluded that it was his duty to attack the enemy immediately, without waiting the arrival of the second brigade; and, accordingly, after detaching Major Jesup with the 25th regiment to cover his right, he pushed vigorously forward through the wood, in his front, with the 9th, 10th, and 22d regiments, supported by Towson's artillery; and was engaged in a conflict, equally obstinate and sanguinary, which continued for an hour with little if any remission, and no decided advantage on either side. During this interesting period, Jesup was not unemployed. Finding a road leading to the enemy's position, which they had either not seen or neglected to occupy, he lost no time in availing himself of it; and in a few minutes, was able to place himself on the left flank of the British line, composed altogether of Canadian volunteers and militia, whom he immediately routed. In the pursuit which followed, several prisoners were made, by whom the Major was informed that 'Drummond was fast advancing from Queenstown with a strong reinforcement, and could not now be far distant.' Under this new circumstance, Jesup boldly determined to seize the road, and hold Drummond in check, till the brigades of Ripley and Porter could be brought into action; nor had he been long in his new position, when Major General Riall, with a large suite, fell into his hands. It being now dark, the firing in his front greatly abated, himself entirely uninformed of the position and views of the commanding General, and much encumbered with prisoners, he pressed cautiously forward, and in a short time was able to place himself on the right of Ripley's brigade."

"During the early part of these occurrences, General Brown apprised, by the weight and continuity of the firing in his front, that the first brigade had encountered a force much more formidable than that of an ordinary picket or patrol, gave orders that the second, with Hindman's artillery and Porter's volunteers, should immediately move to its support. After which, setting out promptly himself, he joined General Scott; and finding on his arrival, that the ranks of this officer had been greatly thinned by the preceding action, and that such part of the corps as had escaped wounds and death, was much exhausted by fatigue, he left for the moment where he found it, and hastened forward with Majors McCrea and Wood to reconnoitre the enemy, and select ground for the interposition of the advancing corps. In performing this service, the attention of all was speedily attracted by the site given to the British artillery; which, from its greater elevation, and other circumstances, gave it a complete command of the field of battle, and drew from the senior engineer a decided opinion, that 'to gain the victory, the first thing to be done was to storm the British battery,'

The commanding General, entirely coinciding in the opinion, hastened to meet the advancing corps, and on doing so, directed Colonel Miller to put himself at the head of the 21st regiment, and make the charge. We need scarcely add that the order was executed with the characteristic alacrity and boldness of the veteran to whom it was given."

"Still, however decisive the appearance of the achievement at first view, it was soon discovered that, in fact, it was but the signal for renewing the sanguinary conflict already noticed. Stimulated to new efforts by the arrival of large and successive reinforcements, several bold and vigorous attempts were made by Drummond to recover the guns and the ground that he had lost; but in neither of these could he succeed—all were repulsed by the well-directed fire and steady charges of the American line; which, after the first or second repulse of the enemy, had been increased by the shattered remains of Scott's brigade and Porter's volunteers; when, at last, the enemy, deprived as well of the example as the direction of their gallant leader, and losing all hope of effecting their object by any new effort of their now diminished force, withdrew from the field; leaving behind them their dead, their wounded, and the nine pieces of artillery, for the recovery of which, they had dared so much and bled so freely."

All the Reports give credit to General Scott for personal gallantry in this battle, and he deserves it. Some military men have questioned the propriety of his attacking a much superior force well posted, without awaiting the arrival of the second brigade and Porter's militia, which were within three miles, and would have accomplished in the beginning what it did at the end; would have taken the enemy's battery of cannon and prevented the destruction it poured upon Scott's brigade—keeping it at long shot, and so relieving the British line from the American musketry, and holding such a position from its elevation, as to render the reply of Towson's artillery so ineffectual, that "he ceased firing as useless." However this may be, the renown which the General, the officers, and men of Scott's brigade earned by the daring and hardihood displayed was worth much to the country. The great wrong which Scott committed was the effort he made, and still makes, to deprive his companions of their justly acquired fame, and to take it all to himself. A comparison of the Scott recital with that of Armstrong's, makes manifest the attempt to deprive the commander-in-chief of the least share of the glory acquired; and the injustice done to his subordinates is not less remarkable.

Major, now General Jesup, commanded the 25th regiment. Before the battle began, he was "detached to the right to be governed by circumstances," as General Brown's Diary, Secretary Armstrong's Notices of the battle, and General Jesup's own notes, quoted in Ingersoll's History, aver. Being thus detached from the brigade, General Jesup reports, that he "discovered a narrow road through the wood, which the enemy had either not observed or had neglected to occupy." Determining to avail himself of the advantage thus presented, he left Lieutenant Seymour with one light company to occupy in extended order, the whole front which the regiment would have covered in line, and advancing rapidly on the road, was soon on the enemy's flank—that part of the line being composed of militia and volunteers, fled in disorder without firing a gun, and the Major placed himself in Riall's rear. Here he encountered several detachments of the enemy, all of which he routed, and made numerous prisoners. Whilst making dispositions to attack the enemy's battery in rear, Major Jesup was informed by a prisoner, that General Drummond was a short distance behind with a heavy reserve. Sensible that under these circumstances of the case, it would be folly to attempt to carry his intentions into effect, and that the safety of the army depended upon keeping Drummond in check, and keeping him out of action until General Brown should arrive with Ripley's and Porter's brigade, he seized the Niagara road, took a position to attack advantageously, every force that might advance, and detached Capt. Ketchum with his company to make prisoners all who should attempt to pass, either to the front or to the rear. General Riall and ten or fifteen other officers, and among them General Drummond's aid-de-camp, were captured, with from 200 to 300 men.

"The General with seven or eight officers was sent to the rear of our line, but several officers and nearly all the private soldiers escaped. We had, however, deprived them of their arms. It had now become quite dark, and the firing had partly ceased, when about twenty minutes after Riall had been sent off the field, General Scott's command gave three cheers, which drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Major Jesup moved with his command slowly and silently towards the rear, keeping a fence between his line and the Niagara road. He had proceeded but a short distance, when he was informed that troops were advancing, and he soon met Captain Biddle, of the artillery, from whom he received the pleasing intelligence that General Brown had arrived with his whole force, and was about to renew the action. Not knowing where to find General Brown or General Scott, or where to apply for orders, Major Jesup decided to resume his former position in the rear, and he had nearly attained it, when he met a part of the enemy's force advancing, which he attacked and routed with great slaughter. A few moments previously, a heavy firing on and near the heights announced that our troops had attacked the enemy there. General Brown then approached Major Jesup and informed him that Colonel Miller had carried the heights with the bayonet, and had taken the enemy's artillery. By his order the Major fell back and joined Gen. Ripley, on the heights, by whom he was posted with his command on the right of the line which was then forming. The enemy gave us but little time to rest; he advanced in line, supported by a heavy reserve, evidently with the intention of charging; his left was almost in contact with the 25th before the firing commenced. Our troops took deliberate aim, and our fire was so terrible, that in a few minutes his line recoiled—then broke, and officers and men fled from the field. Our line was adjusted, and the cartridges taken from the soldiers who had been killed and wounded, and distributed among those who remained unhurt. In about half an hour, the enemy approached again in great force, and in good order, and after a severe conflict, which lasted fifteen or twenty minutes, he broke and again fled from the field. Major Jesup, who, about the time General Riall was taken, had received a wound by a ball passing through the right shoulder, received a slight wound in the neck, and a shot through the right hand. In a short time the enemy was again seen to be advancing apparently with undiminished force. To preserve the 25th, Major Jesup was obliged to form his men in a single rank, and to put all the files in closer order into that rank. The contest was now more obstinate than any of the previous attacks of the enemy; for half an hour the blaze from the muskets of the two lines mingled; but ours was so well directed, and so destructive, that the enemy was again compelled to retire. During this contest, General Scott joined the 25th, and whilst conversing with Major Jesup received a wound in the left shoulder, which compelled him to leave the field. General Brown soon after approached, and enquired for

General Scott, wishing to devolve on him the command, as he was severely wounded; but being informed that General Scott was wounded also, he retired. Major Jesup soon after received a contusion on the breast by a piece of a shell, or perhaps the stock of a rocket, which brought him to the ground; in a few minutes, however, he rose and resumed his command, which had temporarily devolved on Captain Murdoek. In this attack, Captain Kinney and Ensign Hunter of the 25th, were killed, and Lieutenants Sholer, McChard and Dewitt, were severely wounded. So sanguinary had the last conflict been, that, when it terminated, Major Jesup found a considerable interval between his corps and the troops on the left of him."

The reader of the various narratives, especially the testimony before the court, by which the whole affair of Ripley's case was investigated, will find Jesup's statements verified at all points, which indeed are not contradicted. But it will be perceived that Scott appropriates all Jesup's independent action, and that "skill" which President Madison blazons in the brevet commission with his own pen which made him a colonel,—the consummate skill which availed itself of circumstances of which Scott knew nothing, which captured General Riall, defeated the provincial militia—of all of which "the quick eye of Scott" saw nothing, and could not, therefore, have discovered the opportunity of attacking—which held Drummond in check, although Scott had no knowledge of his approach—all this important service which Jesup rendered, preventing Scott's brigade from being overwhelmed before Brown brought up the other two brigades, General Scott assumes was the work of "*his own quick eye discovering an opportunity.*"

This arrogation of all the honors of the field by General Scott was not confined to Gen. Jesup. Although it was his (Scott's) duty to report of the conduct of the officers and of the several corps under his command, that they might be rewarded according to their merit, he evaded what would have been the most grateful function to a man of generous heart, where those supporting him had exhibited ability and heroism of which Cæsar himself might have been proud to make a boast. But Scott wished to engross all, and would do nothing therefore to make anybody conspicuous but himself. Instead of devoting himself to what was his official, and ought to have been a most grateful duty—making a report of the conduct of the men and officers who had fought and won the battle, he went from city to city making an exhibition of himself like the Irish giant, as though heroes were to be measured by feet and inches.

The Pictorial History produces him in one of its wood cut prints as appearing on this tour, on the stage at Princeton College, playing the part of the model hero before the ingenuous youth of that celebrated Institution. But while thus appropriating to himself the renown of Lundy's Lane, Gen. Scott was forgetful of the noblest attribute of the hero—he forgot the brave comrades whose blood bought the achievement—Jesup, whose hand was torn to fragments, whose shoulder was perforated by a ball, who was wounded in the neck by another, and whose breast was bruised by the fragment of a shell—McNeill, who was shot through the knee and the whole limb stiffened for life—Brady, covered with wounds, but who still lingered on the field to encourage others when he could no longer fight—Leavenworth, who rallied Scott's broken regiment after the last charge, when the General himself had abandoned it and thrown himself into Jesup's regiment, which maintained its position—Worth, his own aid, dangerously wounded and borne from the field, in which he had distinguished himself by his gallantry—all those who lived and would have enjoyed his praise, and those who died to deserve it, were forgotten by their General in his exultation. He made no report of their deeds to the Commanding General or to the country. The consequence of this omission was deeply but silently felt by the officers of Scott's brigade.—General McNeill however, having hobbled down to advanced age, with his whole limb from the hip to the foot, converted into what was but little better than a stick of timber, felt authorized by his necessities, to apply to Congress for a pension, doing so however, most reluctantly. There was no official report setting forth his service and suffering to justify his appeal. To supply the want, he induced the Committe on Pensions to call out testimony in 1845, by letter from Gen. Jesup, one of the few surviving field-officers of the Brigade. The reply of General Jesup to the chairman of the Committee, with the letter enclosing it to Gen. NcNeill, saves the trouble of all comment on the injustice and ingratitude of General Scott.

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY,
January 13th, 1845.

MY DEAR GENERAL—

Agreeably to my promise, I enclose you a copy of a letter I addressed to the Hon. Mr. Phelps, of the Committee on Pensions of the Senate, in answer to a letter from him making inquiries as to your services in the late war. I also enclose you, in the form of a memoir, an abstract from my journal kept during the campaign on the Niagara in 1814; which, though not so full as I could have made it, from the abundance of my notes, had I been able to devote more time to the subject, I flatter myself will be satisfactory to you, from the fact that it notices your admirable manœuvre at Chippewa, in the precise language in which I recorded it at the time. And I now proceed, in compliance with your request, to give you, in as few words as possible, an account of what occurred between our late friend Leavenworth and myself, when it was ascertained that General Scott had left for Europe, without having reported the movements and operations of his brigade at Lundy's Lane, or taken any measures to cause justice to be done to those who commanded the regiments which composed it. The action of Congress on the subject of rewarding the several officers who were acknowledged by the government and the country to have distinguished themselves, when known to us, was extremely mortifying to us all. I felt, perhaps, the more keenly the course adopted by Congress towards us, from the fact that General Brown had, in his report of the battle at Lundy's Lane, classed me with Generals Scott and Porter, and Colonel Miller. On all of whom, Medals and the thanks of the nation had been conferred. In the autumn of 1815, Leavenworth wrote to me in relation to the neglect and injustice with which we had, in his opinion, been treated; and urged the necessity of immediate measures to have ourselves righted. He insisted that we were all entitled to as much as any, except General Brown, who had received the high rewards of the nation. You had, on your own responsibility and without orders from any one, made a decided movement at Chippewa, and had rallied the portion of the brigade that first broke at Lundy's Lane. Leavenworth had, at the latter place,

rallied the fragments of the brigade, formed and brought it back into action, when having been placed, by the headlong, but indiscreet, valor of General Scott, under the fire of our own line as well as that of the enemy, it had broken and fled. I had made a decisive and effective movement at Chippewa; and had adopted and carried out, on my own responsibility, a series of movements and manœuvres at Lundy's Lane, by which I succeeded in turning General Riall, made him and several of his officers prisoners; and checked the movements of General Drummond's division, and kept it out of action until Gen. Brown had reached the field with Porter's and Ripley's brigades, by which Gen. Scott was saved from disastrous defeat. What you and Leavenworth had done was not noticed at all. But Gen. Brown having witnessed my closing operations, noticed them in his report. So far as concerned us all, Leavenworth blamed General Scott; and so far as related to all but me, he blamed General Brown. When Leavenworth wrote to me, General Scott was in Europe—his omission to report the operations of his brigade, I ascribed to accident or inadvertence, not to design; and I assured Leavenworth of my belief, that he would voluntarily do us full justice on his return. I declined, when called upon by Leavenworth, to unite with you and him in asking justice at the hands of General Scott after his return; or in taking any measures to bring the matter to the notice of Congress; because I felt that I had contributed fully as much as General Scott had to the brilliant victories achieved on the Niagara frontier; and much more than some of those on whom the legislature had lavished the highest honors of the country; and I could not consistently with a proper self-respect be a suppliant for that which I had fairly won—neither did I believe that either of you could. Besides, I believed (as I expressed myself in my letter to Leavenworth at the time) that no national distinction was worth possessing which was not spontaneously bestowed, in accordance with the public voice. General Scott was bound, as a man of honor, to place us all fairly before the government and the country. I had entire confidence that he would do so. You and Leavenworth doubted—time, that tests all things, has shown which was right. No report, I believe, has yet been made by General Scott. General Brown, about a week before his death, declared to me that General Scott had not, up to that time, furnished him with any account of the operations of his brigade at Lundy's Lane; and assigned that as a reason for not mentioning you, Brady, and Leavenworth—he added that he reported nothing in relation to me but what passed under his own eye. I have made inquiry of the representatives of General Brown, and also of the Adjutant General of the Army, and from both the answer is, that no report of General Scott, in relation to the operations of his brigade at Lundy's Lane is to be found. I take it for granted he made none, and it will be for him to explain how, owing, as he does, his brilliant reputation to our exertions more than to his own, he has committed the injustice of remaining so long silent.

Pressed for time, and separated from most of my papers, I have not been able to answer your inquiries as fully, perhaps, as you expected, and as I desired. Should I live to return to Washington, I will answer more in detail. In the meantime, remain, most cordially, yours,

(Signed.) T. S. JESUP.

Gen. JOHN MCNEILL,
Late of the Army, Boston, Massachusetts.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, January 2, 1840.

SIR: I have received your note requesting information on the subject of General McNeill's services in the campaign on the Niagara in 1814, it affords me sincere pleasure to bear testimony to the meritorious and gallant conduct of that officer.

At the battle of Chippewa, the 1st brigade, composed of the 9th, 11th, and 25th regiments, and a small detachment of the 22d, had to pass the bridge over Street's creek, under the fire of a British battery. Gen. McNeill, then a Major, was second officer of the 11th; but before it had taken its place in the line, he succeeded to the command of it, by the fall of Col. Campbell. I followed the 11th with my command across the bridge—and being ordered to the left, I was obliged to pass in rear of it to attain my position. I had, therefore, an opportunity of witnessing the conduct of Gen. McNeill from the time we marched from our camp until I passed the left of his line, then engaged in deadly conflict—he formed his regiment under the fire of the enemy, with the accuracy of parade, and such was his perfect self-possession, that every word of command he gave could be distinctly heard far beyond his own line. He promptly availed himself of every advantage presented by the ground and the errors of the enemy—and wielded his force with as much coolness and judgment, as the accomplished chess player displays in the movement of his pieces on the chess board. The enemy was beaten, and he certainly contributed as much to the victory as any other man on the field.

At the battle of Bridgewater, General McNeill led his regiment into the field with his accustomed gallantry, and formed on the ground assigned to him, under the fire of a British battery of nine pieces of artillery. There his regiment, as well as the brigade of which it formed a part, was literally cut to pieces—grape and canister were poured upon them like hail—and though they were placed too far from the enemy to act with decisive effect, and were opposed with superior numbers, the conflict was maintained more than an hour, until General Brown arrived on the field with Ripley's and Porter's brigades. General McNeill was severely wounded. I was on another part of the field; but I was informed at the time that his horse had been killed under him, and that a canister shot had passed through his leg. The officers who commanded the regiments of the second brigade, have received the highest honors of the nation, or of their respective States, while those who commanded the regiments of the first brigade have, with a single exception, (General Brady) remained unnoticed; this is perhaps to be ascribed to the fact, that the commander of the brigade, who owes to it his whole reputation, has not to this day reported its operations at Bridgewater.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
(Signed,) T. S. JESUP.

The Hon. S. PHELPS, Senate U. S.

There is one point made in Scott's autobiography which characterizes the man more than any other in the whole book. He sees *now* what he ought to have seen, but did not see at the very threshold of the battle of Lundy's Lane.—The British battery of cannon placed with great skill on the crest of a hill, commanded the whole slope by which our army was to approach it, and Towson's battery could not counteract it, from its position under the hill. Leavenworth in his testimony in Ripley's case, says: "Col. Towson finding from the elevated situation of the enemy's artillery, that he could not bring his artillery to bear upon them, had nearly or quite ceased firing." At the beginning of the battle all he could do with his battery was to animate our troops to stand by the thunder of his guns. Leavenworth says: "The company of artillery under the command of Colonel (then Captain) Towson, an officer above any encomium, was moved up and formed on the right of the 9th regiment, and by *its frequent and incessant discharges highly animated the spirit of our troops.*" And this was all he could do in the position in which he was placed. They stood and were shot down, and fired to animate the infantry to stand and be shot down. And this continued to be the case until Gen. Brown came and saw that the battery must be taken or the whole army sacrificed. Scott sees that *now*, although he did not see it when he might have preserved his gallant brigade by rushing on the battery, with the bayonet in the beginning, instead of standing 200 or 300 yards off, plying it ineffectually with musketry, and equally ineffectually with artillery. He sees it now, when the author and executor of this decisive charge are in their graves, and he endeavors to

strip them both of the merit of the achievement. He says: "The regiment of the heroic Miller was dispatched on the perilous service of silencing the British battery on the heights. Gen. Scott volunteered to lead the way, and did so through the darkness, up to the point of attack." This is out and out a shameful falsehood. We have in the autobiography a wood-cut with Scott on horseback leading Miller's regiment to the attack. Now, of the survivors of that battle two are in Washington city, and will both testify, that Scott was never heard of before in connection with that charge. He was thrown back some five hundred yards from the heights to gather his broken brigade, and while he was thus employed, Brown interposed Porter's and Ripley's brigades and took the battle into his own hands. It was at this crisis, when Scott was out of the battle entirely, that Brown's first movement was to storm the battery. Brown says himself that McCrea, of his staff and principal engineer, suggested it as soon as they were in the field. Ripley also saw the necessity of it and mentioned it to Miller, and Miller's letter to Brown proves that the General-in-chief personally gave the order. Miller, in a letter to Brown, says: "The fact is, after receiving from yourself the order to storm and take the enemy's battery, I obeyed it as soon as possible with my regiment." In Ripley's trial, where this point is closely scanned as the leading incident of the battle, Scott is not mentioned as being consulted even, much less acting in it.

Scott's Injustice to Van Rensellaer, Wool, &c.

The same spirit of monopoly characterizes the account of every transaction of the war of 1812, with which General Scott had any connection, and which is made to figure with the recent pictorial illustration of his life. The battle of Queenstown Heights was fought by Colonel Van Rensellaer, and after he fell, wounded by several balls, by Captain, now General Wool, who, with Captain Ogilvie, stormed the British batteries. The battle had begun "a few minutes before daybreak," and the heights were taken and the batteries stormed (in the process of which the British Commander-in-chief, General Brock, was killed) between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. "About this time," says General Wool, which was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Christie arrived and took the command." There had been, after the flight of the British on the death of Brock and the storming of the batteries, a cessation of the conflict. It was then that Lieutenant Col. Scott crossed the river and appeared on the scene of action, and Armstrong, the Secretary of War, thus notices the share he had in it:

"Between two and three o'clock, P. M., a scattering fire was heard on the southern side of the heights, produced by an Indian attack made on a small party of straggling militia; who being completely surprised, fled in great confusion, and carrying their panic along with them, threatened to extend the infection to other corps. It was at this critical moment, that Lieut. Colonel Scott, of the Second Regiment of Artillery, placing himself at the head of a few platoons of regular troops, charged the savages with a gallantry which soon checked, and at length, drove them into a neighboring wood; where the combat became nearly stationary, and a mere trial of skill at sharp shooting. Perceiving that a champ de bataille like this, secured to the Indians all the advantages of their habitual and peculiar mode of fighting, while to his own troops it produced effects directly the reverse, the Lieut. Colonel prudently withdrew his party to the open ground, and there took a position, which, though it did not entirely put an end to the attack, made it too inefficient, longer to disturb the order of the American line."

"A discovery was, however, soon made, that the savages were not the only enemy the invading corps would have to contend with. From the heights of Queenstown, in the distance eastward, was now seen advancing a column of artillery and infantry. Its approach, though slow and circumspect, was steady and unremitting; and of its character and objects there could be no doubt. About three o'clock, P. M., Gen. Sheafe, the successor of Brock, and leader of the column, after turning the village and throwing into it a detachment competent to its defence, presented himself and a force of eight hundred regulars, militia and Indians, in front of the American line—now reduced to less than three hundred combatants, and sustained but by a single piece of artillery badly supplied with ammunition."

"The British commander in the meantime continued to manœuver from right to left, and from left to right; countermarching nearly the whole length of the American line twice, as if determined to count every man in the ranks, and to make himself familiar with every foot of the position, before he hazarded an attack. This deliberation on his part, gave time for renewed councils on that of his adversary; and a second consultation being held, a determination was at last taken to try the experiment of a retreat, as recommended by General Van Rensselaer. To have executed successfully a purpose of this kind, in the face of an enemy so much more formidable than themselves, in numbers, discipline and variety of arms, would have been no easy task for soldiers the most practised, officers the most skilful; but was perfectly hopeless when required from American levies, who had seen only an imperfect service of three or four months. The result was such as might have been, and probably was anticipated by the reflecting portion of the corps; the first step taken in retreat, produced a movement on the part of the enemy, which at once converted the march into a route; and (superadded to the fact, that not a boat was found on the shore ready to receive them) made necessary an immediate and unconditional surrender."

This is the clear and succinct account of all that occurred after Scott joined the assailants of Queenstown. He did not cross from the American shore until after the field was won, the battery stormed, the British General and his aid killed, and the British force driven off, which cost a series of struggles beginning at dawn and continuing until between three and four in the afternoon. In the various conflicts, Col. Van Rensellaer had six balls shot through him, wounding him in the hip, thigh, and leg; but he continued in command as long as he could stand. Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris were killed, Lieutenant Rathbone, Captain Armstrong (son of the Secretary,) and Captain (now General) Wool, were severely wounded; Captain Ogilvie, Lieutenant Kearney, (late General,) Lieutenants Randolph, Carr, and Hugenin, and Ensign Riel are all reported to have greatly distinguished themselves. Captain Nelson was mortally wounded at another point, and Lieut. Col. Fenwick, Lieutenants Phelps and Clark, and their whole party cut to pieces. The hard service of crossing the rapid Niagara, under the fire of the enemy—scaling the almost perpen-

dicular heights of Queenstown—storming the batteries; in a word, the bloody work was done, and almost all the officers who achieved the victory, festering in their wounds, when Col. Scott and Col. Christie—the latter took command—came on the field. They did well. They had a skirmish with a party of Indians, drove them into the woods, and then returned to their position, the Indians following. Here they remained until the British General Sheafe, with a superior force from Fort George, surrounded and compelled them to surrender. But is this momentary skirmish with the Indians, retreat and surrender, to eclipse all the heroism of almost a whole day's struggle with Brock at the head of England's best troops, and the battle which England immortalized on her own soil by a lofty monument, built on the spot where Brock fell, and overlooking two lakes—is this proud trophy which it cost the blood of so many brave men to earn, to be absorbed by Scott's skirmish with a handful of Indians, emerging from the woods, drawing him out and driving him in again? Or was the speech from the log, which is given now with all the finish of Livy, and which produced the resolution, *never to surrender*—but which was immediately followed by a *surrender*—to outweigh the resolution which did all the hard fighting? Is Scott's eloquence on a log to give him all the glory of the field? It seems so, for in the new life with wood-cuts, every body is to be put out of the way, and Scott made to figure as the commander-in-chief—the Life stating on Scott's arrival that "*the entire command of the corps, 600 strong, was at once committed to him.*" This happens to be an entire falsehood. General Wadsworth being, as Armstrong states, "the senior officer in the field" at the close of the day, and Wool, who commanded until the batteries were stormed, and he himself shot, states expressly, that he was first superseded by Christie, who ranked Scott. His report closes thus: "*The wounded and prisoners I ordered to the guard house, about this time which was between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Lieut Colonel Christie arrived and took command. He ordered me across the river to get my wounds dressed. I remained a short time. Our flanking parties had been driven in by the Indians, but General Wadsworth and other officers arriving, we had a short skirmish with them, and they recoiled and I crossed the river.*"

From this it is evident that the Life, not content with taking all the credit of the fight for Scott, takes also the honor of the command, to which he was as little entitled.

Scott's Injustice to General Dearborn, General Lewis, and Com. Chauncey.

The next display in the Pictorial History, is the taking of Fort George. We have two engravings—one, "the battle of Fort George," which exhibits a furious onset of swords and musketry—the other, the feat of "Scott tearing down the Flag." Now here is the full account of the whole affair as given by General Armstrong who is partial to Scott, and inimical to Dearborn, who commanded the expedition:—

"It was not till the 8th of May, that they arrived off "Fort George: nor until the 27th, that they were suffi- "ciently prepared for the attack of that post. At four "o'clock, A. M. of this day, the batteries on the American "side of the Niagara being ready for action, the means "necessary for transportation provided, and considerable "reinforcement of troops drawn from Sackett's Harbor— "(now amounting to nearly six thousand combatants,) "began their movements in boats, along the lake shore, "to Two Mile Run, the point designated for a general "landing. When abreast of this, they rested on their "oars, till the armed vessels had severally taken their "covering positions, and the signal had been given for des- "cent; after which resuming the movement, they pressed "vigorously forward to the shore. At nine o'clock, the "light infantry commanded by Colonel Scott, effected a "landing; and being speedily supported by Boyd's brigade, "and a well directed fire from the shipping were soon en- "abled to surmount the bank, break down the enemy's "line in their front, and compel its scattered parts to fly "in the direction of Newark and Fort George.

"On approaching these, Vincent, the British comman- "der, finding the former in the flames, and the latter, nearly "if not altogether untenable, wisely determined to hazard "a retreat in the face of his enemy, and thus by deserting "his post, multiply the chances of saving the garrison.— "Fortunately for him, a contingency of this kind was "neither provided for in the original plan of attack, nor "by subsequent order given on the field; and would per- "haps have entirely escaped notice, had not Scott from "his advanced position, made the discovery, and deemed it "his duty to institute and continue in a pursuit of five miles; "not merely without orders, but in evasion of such as were "given, until at last a mandate reached him, of a character "so decided and peremptory as by leaving nothing to "discretion, could not fail to recall him to Fort George."

The only shew of fight made by the British was made at the landing, which is thus described by Commodore Chauncey who did all the execution. He is quoted by Armstrong, thus: "All the vessels anchored within musket shot of the shore, and in ten minutes after they opened on the [water] batteries, they were completely silenced and abandoned." Again: "The enemy who had been concealed in a ravine, now advanced in great force to the edge of the bank to charge our troops [when] the schooners opened so well directed and tremendous a fire of grape and canister, that they [the enemy,] soon retreated from the bank."

The British arrayed to oppose Scott's landing on the bank, were met with "so tremendous a fire of grape and canister, that they soon retreated."

General Dearborn who commanded, in his official account to the Secretary, shews who took Fort George. He says:

"Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious arrangements for silencing the enemy's batteries near the point of landing. The army is under the greatest obligation to that able naval commander for his co operation in all its important movements and especially in its operations this day. Our batteries succeeded in rendering Fort George untenable, and when the enemy had been driven from his positions and found it necessary to re enter it, after firing a few guns and setting fire to the magazines, which soon exploded, he moved off rapidly by different routes—our light troops pursued them several miles."

Here is General Morgan Lewis's account of the affair. He commanded all the corps whose landing was covered by Chauncey's guns:

"On the Field, 1 P. M., 27th May, 1813.

Dear Sir :—Fort George and its dependencies are ours. The enemy beaten at all points, has blown up his magazines and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any thing of individual gallantry—there was no man who did not perform his duty in a manner which did honor to himself and country. Scott's and Forsyth's commands supported by Boyd's and Winder's brigades sustained the brunt of the action. Our loss is trifling—perhaps not more than twenty killed and over that number wounded. The enemy has left in the hospital 124, and sent several on board the fleet. We have also made about 100 prisoners of the regular forces.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
MORGAN LEWIS.

Major General Dearborn,
Com. in Chief of the Northern Army."

Fort George was abandoned at the moment of the landing, and if the ceremony of tearing down the flag was left for Gen. Scott to do with "his own hands," it is not found in any of the official reports, in which Scott would have been careful to have had it inserted, if the fact would justify it. Every body who knows any thing of him knows that he would insist upon such an exploit of pageantry, especially as there was little else left to boast of. The fighting and execution were done by Chauncey, by whose broadsides the British were cut up. Yet like Gen. Dearborn and General Lewis, he is omitted in Scott's memoir, except only to say, that the "debarkation alone of the troops was covered by the little fleet of Commodore Chauncey." From this no one would suppose that the enemy were driven to retreat by his guns, leaving nothing but the chase to Scott.

President Madison supplanted by General Scott.

The war of 1812 was declared to protect our native and naturalized citizens from British impressment. The British government asserted the right of impressment solely upon the pretext that a British subject could not expatriate himself, or by swearing allegiance to the United States, exonerate himself from the authority of his native country. Every Englishman, Scotchman or Irishman found on board our ships was under this pretext, made liable to be impressed. Our Government resolved to encounter all the calamities of war in resistance to this principle, which in practice was made a cover under which to drag native born Americans as well as naturalized citizens, from our ships. As soon as the war commenced, the British government pushed their principle to its necessary consequence, and proclaimed every man who had been a British subject, a traitor if he bore arms in defence of the United States, his adopted country. Following up this doctrine, the first prisoners taken by England were winnowed for these traitors, and our naturalized citizens found among them were put in irons and *sent home*, as it is called, to be tried for high treason. The first case occurred in August, 1812. On the 18th of October, 1812, the Wasp which had captured the British ship Frolic was taken by the British 74, Poictiers.—Niles's Register, vol , p. 223.

Noticing the progress the British were making in seizing our adopted citizens as traitors, an officer of the U. S. Sloop Wasp, says in a letter, that "the boatswain of that ship and some of the crew have been detained at Bermuda on suspicion of being British subjects, with a view to try them for treason. This is the third case in which some of our sailors have been detained on this plea. The two former were promptly met by putting into close confinement *twice the number* so held by the enemy, as hostages for the safety of our people, and we trust the like procedure will prevail in this instance, as well as that punishment may be inflicted, *pari passu*, in all cases and at every hazard. General Washington was reluctantly compelled to adopt this line of conduct during the revolution."

General Scott takes to himself, in his autobiography, the credit of having first established this retaliatory system in favor of our adopted citizens, by bringing his personal influence to bear on Congress in 1813!! But let us hear what Mr. Madison says on this subject in his Message of 1812.

Extract from the President's Message :

"The British commander in that Province, nevertheless, with the sanction, as appears, of his government, thought proper to select from American prisoners of war, and send to Great Britain, for trial, as criminals, a number of individuals who had emigrated from the British dominions long prior to the state of war between the two nations, who had incorporated themselves with our political society in the modes recognized by the law and practice of Great Britain, and who were made prisoners of war under the banners of their adopted country, fighting for its rights and its safety.

"The protection due to these citizens requiring an effectual interposition in their behalf, a like number of British prisoners of war were put into confinement, with a notification that they would experience whatever violence might be committed on the American prisoners of war sent to Great Britain.

"It was hoped that this necessary consequence of the step unadvisedly taken on the part of Great Britain, would have led her government to reflect on the inconsistences of its conduct, and that a sympathy with the British, if not with the American sufferers, would have arrested the cruel career opened by its example.

"This unhappily was not the case. In violation both of consistency and of humanity, American officers and non commissioned officers, in double the number of the British soldiers confined here, were ordered into close confinement with formal notice that in the event of a retaliation for the death which might be inflicted on the prisoners of war sent to Great Britain for trial, the officers so confined would be put to death also. It was notified at the same time that the commanders of the British fleets and armies on our coasts are instructed, in the same event, to proceed with a destructive severity against our towns and their inhabitants.

"That no doubt might be left with the enemy of our adherence to the retaliatory resort imposed on us, a correspondent number of British officers, prisoners of war in our hands, were immediately put into close confinement to abide the fate of those confined by the enemy; and the British government has been apprized of the determination of this government to retaliate any other proceedings against us contrary to the legitimate modes of warfare.

"It is as fortunate for the United States that they have it in their power to meet the enemy in this deplorable contest, as it is honorable to them that they do not join in it but under the most imperious obligations, and with the humane purpose of effectuating a return to the established usages of war."

With these facts before the reader, let him examine Gen. Scott's pretension of having been the man who put this retaliatory system into operation. Observe what a heroic demonstration

he makes of himself, in setting up his own championship on this great national question, in regard to which he would leave the reader to suppose, the President and government had been entirely remiss, if not afraid to take a stand.

"Among the prisoners taken by the British at Queenstown with Scott, were about sixty naturalized citizens, a large portion of whom were Irishmen. The British authorities claimed the right, and expressed the determination, to hang them as traitors. These men were at Quebec on board a vessel with Scott and the rest of the prisoners, all bound to Boston to be exchanged. The British officers came on board and began to select the Irishmen, whom they intended to send home to grace the gallows. The officers had no sure means of detecting the Irish but by their brogue, or their confession. Scott, who was below, hearing what was going on, immediately rushed on deck, and told his afflicted men to hold their peace. Then, turning to the British officers, he boldly denounced their proceedings, and threatened a like retaliation upon British prisoners if they dared to execute a single man among his comrades.

The officers haughtily reminded him that he was himself a prisoner, and ordered him into the cabin. He was not a man to be intimidated, and refused to go, and again called upon his Irish soldiers to answer no more questions. A high quarrel ensued; but the result was that no more of the prisoners could be identified as Irishmen, for they would not open their lips. The officers, however, had already selected twenty-three before Scott made his appearance. These were separated from their fellow prisoners and put on board a frigate, and dispatched to England to be hung. But they did not go until Scott had solemnly warned the British authorities that *he would surely avenge the death of every man they dared to lay violent hands upon, by a terrible retribution upon the first English prisoners that should fall into his hands after he should be liberated.*

Scott was soon exchanged. How faithfully he kept his promise we shall see. He proceeded at once to Washington, and obtained the passage, by Congress, of a law to retaliate upon British prisoners any such outrage as was threatened at Quebec. He again fought and conquered. He had prisoners in plenty. He forthwith selected twenty-three of genuine English descent, (for he declared he would not offset Irish by Irish,) and held them as hostages for the doomed twenty three Irishmen taken home to be executed. He then communicated to the British authorities what he had done, and informed them that if they dared to execute their threat on the twenty-three Irishmen, the twenty three Englishmen should pay the penalty by promptly sharing the same fate. The consequence was, that the lives of the Irishmen were spared, and at the close of the war they were embarked from England, and shortly after arrived in New York."

What a tremendous threat (Scott himself being a prisoner at Quebec,) when "he solemnly warned the British authorities that he would surely avenge the death of every man they dared to lay hands upon, by a terrible retribution upon the first English prisoners that should fall into his hands, after he should be liberated!!" Is it not wonderful that they dared to liberate him? The President had sometime before, ordered two for one to be incarcerated as hostages for every adopted citizen whose life was threatened, and the officers of our army and navy had duly executed the order. But what was the actual execution of the threat by such Lilliputians as Madison and Brown and Decatur, and the rest of our commanders by the land and sea in comparison with the bare assertion of Captain Lemuel Gulliver, when he was a prisoner on board a British ship!"—That dread word spoken by the terrific Scott was more potent than the President's, backed by the army and navy. "The consequence was that the lives of the Irishmen were spared."

It is a pity to spoil this heroic drama so beautifully gotten up by General Scott's fancy on the eve of the Presidential election to reconcile our adopted citizens to support him, after having boasted that he was the founder of the party whose object was to prevent them from being adopted citizens at all. But it must be done.—Mr. Madison's message proves that what Scott pretends he started in 1813, was executed as national law from the threshold of the war in 1812; and the statute of 1813 (of which Scott assumes the paternity) in relation to retaliation, proves that the very particulars which he gives to color his fabrication, must be false. The act was not passed to empower the President to do what he had already done, but to give the authority of Congress to a more stringent measure, that of retaliating the death of any adopted citizen executed for treason, as being taken in arms, by that of any British subject whether taken in arms or not, and wherever found. A bill had been introduced by Mr. Wright to authorize retaliation, but it had been laid aside as unnecessary, the President having the power and having exercised it. At the close of the session Mr. Campbell of Tennessee obtained the passage of a bill designating the mode of retaliation, as well as authorizing it and prescribing how it should be brought to bear upon the enemy—the sufferers to be selected as follows: It designates "*in the first instance, a prisoner who having been in the United States and having been a citizen thereof, shall have been taken whilst voluntarily bearing arms in the service of Great Britain against the United States.*"

The second class is composed of those "*native of some one of the British colonies, now the United States, as may not have been a citizen of the United States.*"

And 3d, on failure to find a sufficient number of either class among the prisoners taken from the enemy, the President might "*cause retaliation to be executed on any British subject wherever found, and whether taken in arms or not against the United States*"—(*See the Act in 3d vol. of Niles's Register, p.* 358.)

This record defeats therefore, the *circumstantialities* on which the General relied to give the appearance of very exact truth to the story fabricated, to propitiate the Irish and other adopted citizens to his support, notwithstanding his warfare against them, he tells us in detail that after the law passed, "*he again fought and conquered—he had prisoners in plenty—he forthwith selected twenty-three of genuine English descent (for he declared he would not offset Irish by Irish) and held them for the doomed twenty-three Irishmen "taken home to be executed.*"

Now it appears from the very act of Congress which Scott pretends he had caused to be passed, that prisoners of genuine English descent could not be selected in the first or in the second instance. The law makes the selection of the first and second class, and the first might include Irishmen naturalized who had gone over to Canada and joined the British standard, if any such there were. The second class was specified for the purpose of making the tory refugees born in our

country who had taken up arms against it, furnish the next victims. And in the last place, the law allowed any British subject wherever found and whether taken in arms or not, to be put to death in retaliation for the execution of any American citizen, but did not allow Scott "forthwith" to make the selection, or to make it at all, but the President of the United States—and unluckily for *his long memory*, it appears that in the very case of the twenty-three prisoners he cites for his own —the President did not depute him to act in the matter at all, but did depute General Dearborn, a fact shown by that careful collector of news during the war, Niles, who quotes in the 4th vol of his *Register*, page 238, the following passage from General Dearborn's letter: "*I have taken measures in relation to the twenty-three prisoners who are to be put in close confinement.*"

Hence it appears that Scott's attempt to take on himself the functions of the President, of Congress and of General Dearborn, with respect to the retaliatory measures, proves to be a failure from the beginning to the end. The whole drama must pass for a fiction, unless he can bring forward some of the spectators of that remarkable theatrical scene of which we have in the autobiography such an interesting wood-cut —the twenty-three Irish prisoners to a man, landing on the quay at New York, and embracing him. "Singularly enough it so happened"—this is the written account and is the conversational idiom of Scott himself. "Singularly enough it so happened, that on the very day of the landing of these old comrades of General Scott on the wharf, their commander and friend then still suffering from his wounds, passed along the quay on foot. He was instantly recognized by the now liberated prisoners, and knowing all he had accomplished in their behalf, they rushed upon him with cheers, expressing a fervor of affection, gratitude and delight that it is impossible to describe. Their joy was unbounded as the recognition became mutual. He was seized and shaken till the mingled pain of his wounds and the emotions produced by such a heartfelt exhibition caused even the tear of stalwart manhood to course unbidden down his cheek." How like a novel this reads! and how marvelous are the many coincidences! There were upwards of six hundred prisoners carried to England, to answer to the charge of treason. The twenty-three of Scott's drama stuck together in going over to England, hung together through all the changes of their imprisonment in that country, and it "singularly so happened," after the "close of the war," when they were liberated, they all got together on the same ship, reached New York at the very moment that General Scott was walking on the particular quay where they landed, and it singularly so happened too, that "knowing all he had accomplished in their behalf;" that is, that he had got the law passed to take twenty-three of the genuine English in their stead, had taken them prisoners, put them in confinement and so delivered *them* (the Irishmen)—things that never happened at New York, or ever happened at all. The twenty-three "rushed upon him," and he was seized and shaken until the pain of his wound &c., brought about the catastrophe of forcing "the tear of stalwart manhood to course unbidden down his cheek." Now it must be remembered that this wound is itself a contradiction to this story, for the hero was not "still suffering" from it after the close of the war.

Now why is this scene between the Irishmen and General Scott so elaborately worked up and connected with such a narrative in regard to his establishing the retaliatory system, and acting with such zeal under it for the Irish, every word of which is shown to be false by the authentic history of the country? It has its origin in the same motive which produced the following declaration in General Scott's letter of March last, to the Irish committee celebrating St. Patrick's day.

"Perhaps no man" says Gen. Scott, "certainly no American, owes so much to the valor and blood of Irishmen as myself. Many of them marched and fought under my command in the war of 1812–'15; *and many more—thousands in the recent war with Mexico, not one of whom was ever known to turn his back upon the enemy or a friend."*

I am, Gentlemen, with very cordial respect,
WINFIELD SCOTT."

And yet this man hung a whole company of fifty Irishmen called St. Patrick's legion, by platoons, for deserting his standard and fighting for the Mexicans "*in the recent war with* Mexico!" No doubt these deluded men were justly condemned; but there might be something in the motives of their desertion to extenuate their crime. They deserted to a standard to which they were invoked by their religious faith, and they defended it in the field with a courage which extorted praise even from their deeply provoked vanquishers. They fought after the Mexicans had fled, with the enthusiasm of the crusaders when the Cross was their only Banner. The conduct of these men made true one-half at least of what Scott says of them in his letter—they did not turn their backs on him as "an enemy," although the fate to which they were consigned proves that he must have condemned them for deserting him as a "friend." They suffered under Scott's orders the highest penalty that the martial law could inflict. Some four or five of them, and among them Riley, their leader, from the fact that they had deserted in time of peace, could not be brought under the death penalty. These were burned in each cheek with a hot iron and scourged to the last extremity with the *cat*. The rest, about fifty in number, were hung in platoons as already stated. No commutation of sentence was allowed, nor was the remarkable fact that Riley the ringleader and seducer of the rest, was necessarily permitted to go *Scott free*, having deserted before the war, suffered to operate in favor of the dupes of this more intelligent and commanding spirit. This strange exception only distinguishes this execution from that sort of Spanish vengeance which delights in mass massacre. But there is another striking particular which distinguishes this military execution *en masse*, from any other in history. Necessity sometimes compels the execution of bodies of men whom it is difficult to retain as prisoners,

and when their escape may be fatal, or the importance of a dreadful example, when the safety of an army may depend on the prevention of desertion, and when this can only be effected by the utmost severity. In the instance, where almost the whole legion of St Patrick (consisting of eighty men) were immolated, part on the field of Churubusco, the rest on the gallows, no such reasons existed to justify the wholesale slaughter; neither the safety nor the success of the army required it. As if to manifest this to the world, the prisoners were led to execution when our troops were marched to the storm of Chapultepec, and were told that when our flag would be unfurled on this last defence of Mexico, it would be their death signal. They were placed with ropes round their necks in full view of Chapultepec, and made to witness the fall of the ensign to which they had devoted themselves in their Saint's name. This was intended to aggravate the sufferings of their last moments, and to make them feel that their sacrifice was neither the effect of fear nor of necessity, but the indulgence of an appetite for revenge. And what a comment is this upon General Scott's letter to the St. Patrick's Society, celebrating Saint Patrick's Day in Philadelphia! "No man," he tells them, "owes so much to the valor and blood of Irishmen as myself: thousands marched and fought under my command in the recent war with Mexico, not one of whom was ever known to turn his back upon the enemy or a friend!!" And yet, when that flag of ours which owed so much to "the valor and blood of Irishmen," floated in triumph upon the height of Chapultepec, the "legion of St. Patrick," was displayed on the neighboring height hanging on a gallows!! Was it necessary to contrast thus the glory of the United States and the shame of ill-fated Ireland? Was it not enough that these men died for their offence? Was it necessary to make them feel that Ireland was to be humbled, if not disgraced in this day of glory to our countrymen? Do we not see in this event more of the spirit which signalizes Gen. Scott's letter to Mr. Harper, boasting of his being the founder of a society to exclude Irishmen from American citizenship, than of his holiday letter to St. Patrick's Society? Who does not perceive the selfishness and heartlessness which dictated both letters? The Mexican gallows in sight of Chapultepec proclaimed Scott's real feelings towards Irishmen—the old federal feeling which dictated the alien law, giving the elder President Adams the power to send out of the country, the seditious and rebellious Irish democrats (as they were called) who threatened the overthrow of the federal party. Scott's native American party and his appeal, under the signature of AMERICUS, originated in the same party views that produced the alien law of 1798; and the late zeal of the federal leader, which, it is pretended outstripped that of Mr. Madison and the Democrats of his day in favor of our adopted citizens, and which is now so earnest with the Society of St. Patrick, is but the consequence of the failure of the natives as a party of influence.

Scott's quarrel with Gens. Gaines and Macomb; contumacy to the Adams Administration, and ingratitude to Mr. Clay.

The death of General Brown making the place of Commander-in-chief vacant, produced a vehement controversy between Scott and Gaines for the appointment. Each insisted on it as a matter of right and the feud grew to such madness, that to prevent the belligerents appealing to a trial by duel, Gen. Macomb was appointed over them. When Macomb was selected in the hope of allaying the strife between the vindictive rivals, the President found he had only transferred Scott's wrath to himself. He denied the power of the President and Senate to give Macomb a commission which would authorize him to take command of the Army, insisting that his Senior brevet Major Generalship excluded any one else from the chief command. Scott refused to obey Macomb, and in the end the Secretary of War, General Porter, addressed him this letter:

"DEPARTMENT OF WAR,
November 26, 1828.

"SIR:—It is not the purpose of the President to take any final order in relation to your late very reprehensible conduct, until a sufficient time shall have elapsed for the receipt of your deliberate answer to the letter addressed to you from this Department on the 15th inst, and which contains an exposition of the views of the President on the several questions you have raised. The nature of that order will, as you perceive, depend in a great measure on the character of the answer received from you, and which the President hopes may not be wholly unifluenced by the considerations which, by his directions, have been presented to you.

"To put a stop, in the meantime, to the course of insubordination in which you have deemed fit to indulge, the President directs that from the receipt of this letter you will consider yourself suspended from the command of the Western department of the Army, until his further pleasure shall be made known to you.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
P. B. PORTER.

Brevet Major Gen'l SCOTT, U. S. A.,
Cincinnati.

Throughout the controversy with Gaines, Mr. Clay who was premier in the Cabinet, stood staunchly by Scott, and it was generally understood that he favored the lenient course to which the latter owed the retention of his place and obtained what Scott in reply to the above letter from Porter says "sounds like a reprieve." There is hardly a doubt but that for Clay's interposition, Scott would have been cashiered for disobedience of orders.

Two marked incidents in Scott's conduct subsequently tend to develop his character. General Jackson was elected whilst Scott was still under suspension, asserting as he contended his own rights and the rights of his brother officers.—Against Jackson, if against any body, he ought to have maintained his position, and proved that his disobedience was not *muting*. But his first act was to make his submission to the man whom he had charged with mutiny, and in the very act confessed, that while he had held out in contemptuous disobedience to indulgent friends under the pretence of principle, he was ready to succumb and sacrifice it rather than assert it against the authority of the bold man who, he knew "would submit to nothing that was wrong."

Another trait of General Scott's character is evinced in his treatment of his friend Clay who stood by him in his troubles. Every one knows that the favorable crisis in Mr. Clay's career and which seemed likely to decide in his behalf, the appeal to his country against what he called the calumnies of his political opponents, occurred in 1840. If the Whig Convention had nominated Clay instead of Harrison, there is no doubt he would have been elected President. Scott held the balance of power in that Convention and his friends gave the nomination to Harrison—certainly not on the score of superior fitness, but to keep up the military *prestige*. Clay felt this "the unkindest cut of all," and shortly afterwards in an impulsive moment, upbraided Scott to his face, for his foul play, and provoked a state of things which it cost the utmost difficulty among their friends to settle without bloodshed. Scott's ingratitude was the arrow that stuck in Clay's side at his death.

—— *hæret lateri lethalis arundo.*

Scott and his War with the City Councils of New York.

No sooner had Scott got through his exhibition of himself, after the war in Europe as well as in the United States, than he broached a quarrel with the people and councils of the City of New York where he was stationed. The city had given to the Government of the United States, the battery and its beautiful promenade as a position for a castle of defence for the city's protection. Scott, inflated with self-importance resolved to appropriate it as his Head Quarters and build a residence and offices, so that he might himself, occupy the whole of that breathing place of the city, for his own accommodation He thought it polite to inform the city councils of his purpose and to ask their assent. The proposal was received with surprise, but at once, firmly though courteously denied. Scott without considering their consent of any importance, after it was refused, had materials hauled, began the work by digging foundations, and erecting preparatory buildings, when he was obstructed not only by the opposit on of the city, but by menaces of the people. Scott brought some of his soldiers over from Governor's Island to protect his works, which no doubt from the temper he manifested, would have been constructed upon the plan of those in cities under military government, to control the people within, rather than a force without. But the people of this country are not of the race to submit to any thing wearing the appearance of military rule, and especially where it shews itself in abridging the liberty and comfort of a great population, for the convenience of one man. The city was roused to resistance and Scott was compelled by the President to desist.

General Scott's conduct towards President Polk and Secretary Marcy.

It was natural and proper, that being exclusively a military man, and at the head of the army, General Scott should seek, on the opening of the war with Mexico, to take the field and gather fresh laurels to replace those that had faded during the Florida campaign. He shewed the greatest alacrity for the service, as the correspondence with Secretary Marcy proves. He had a presidential game to play against the man who was to trust him. As a candidate for the Whig nomination to the Presidency, from the day when he gave way to Harrison, in 1840, he looked to that interest as permanent. To restore his tarnished repute, and acquire a new recommendation to enforce his claims for his party's support to the presidential honor, were strong incentives to his eager ambition in laying hold of the chief command in Mexico. It was conceded to him by President Polk, and the Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) zealously pressed his preparations. Considering that they were political opponents--that by committing the war, they committed the fate of the administration, to his hands and gave him at the same time the opportunity to outstrip all his Whig rivals, in opening to him the way to victory and supplying the means to reach it, he ought to have been grateful. But what was his first move after he supposed that all was committed to him? that all their plans depended upon him, and that his refusal to lend his military skill and reputation to them would frustrate everything. He determined to bring the administration to an absolute submission to his will—to take his own time, forward on everything before him to Mexico—to trust nothing to the administration, nor allow it to share in any of the duties or glories of the war with Mexico. Although at first professing great readiness to go and assume the functions of General in the field, he resolved after being installed, to stay and play Napoleon, by sending the army in advance, and all that the country could command for his services, before he would make his appearance on the scene of operations. Filled with these self-important designs he wrote the letter which amazed the country so much, and from which we extract the pointed paragraphs. He replied to Mr. Marcy, when urged by him and the President to put himself at the head of that army which Taylor was then leading to successive victories, as follows :

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 21, 1846.

SIR:

* * * * * * * * * *

In the midst of these multitudinous and indi-pensable occupations, I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Rio Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that necessary work, to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger, ill will, (or precondemnation,) in my rear, before advancing upon the public enemy. Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed, nay, crippled

in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to say I fear no other danger.

My intentions have been, after making all preliminary arrangements here, to pass down the Ohio and Mississippi to see, or to assure myself by correspondence, that the volunteers on whom we are mostly to rely in the prosecution of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the service; to learn the probable time of their readiness to advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies of every kind are in place, or are likely to be in place in sufficient time; to hasten one and the other; to harmonize the movements of volunteers, and to modify their routes, (if necessary,) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, shall arrive at the indicated points in the Mexican frontier, at the best periods, and as far as practicable, about the same time. All that I have but sketched, I deem to be not only useful to success, but indispensable. As a soldier I make this assertion without the fear of contradiction from any *honest and candid* soldier.

Against the *ad captandum* condemnation of all persons, whoever may be designated for the high command in question, there can be no reliance (in his absence) other than the active, candid, and steady support of the government. If I cannot have that sure basis to rest upon, it will be infinitely better for the country (not to speak of my personal security) that some other commander of the new army against Mexico should be selected. No matter who he may be, he shall, at least, be judged and supported by me, in this office, and everywhere else, as I would desire, if personally in that command, to be myself judged and supported. My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all positions—*a fire* upon my *rear from Washington*, and a fire in front from the Mexicans. * * * * * * It was to command such larger army that I understood myself as likely to be sent to the Mexican frontier. As it is always unjust to a junior general who has done well, and is supposed to be doing well, to supersede him by a general of higher rank without sending with the latter corresponding reinforcements, I should esteem myself the unhappy instrument of wounding the honorable pride of the gallant and judicious Taylor, if ordered to supersede him under different circumstances.

However the foregoing suggestions (hastily thrown together) may be viewed, I have deemed it due more to the country than my humble self that I should present them, and await the wishes or the orders of the President.

With greatest respect, I have the honor to remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT,

Hon. W. L. Marcy,
Secretary of War.

If there was ever a more dictatorial, insolent and insulting letter than this, written to a chief magistrate by an officer put in command of an army by his favor, history has not preserved it. The obvious import is, "Sir, I do not mean to trust you. You know I am a candidate for the high post which you hold and to which you wish to be re-elected, and you will be willing to sacrifice the country, to sacrifice me, and as soon as I turn my back you will make war on me whilst I make war on Mexico. I shall be between two fires, one in front and one in rear. You will withhold supplies that I may fail in my functions, and that you may profit by my fall. Therefore I will stay, take it on myself to see that the War Department forwards force and supplies sufficient to render me independent of your authority, and then I will go and play the part of master abroad as I must at home before leaving"

There is no man of penetration who will not at a glance perceive the imperious spirit illy disguised in the presumptuous mystification of this letter. The Secretary of War answered with his habitual cool, good sense—

War Department, *May* 25, 1846.

Sir: I have received your letter of the 21st inst., and considering its extraordinary character, and the grave matters set forth therein, reflecting upon the motives and objects of the President in tendering to you, as he has in an explicit manner, the command of the forces destined for the war against Mexico, I deemed it to be my duty to lay it before him, and to take his direction in regard to its contents.

The passages in your letter which have excited his surprise and deep regret are those in which you impute to the President, in terms not inexplicit *ill* will towards yourself, or precondemnation, and a course of conduct on his part, which has already, as you allege, impeded your labors of preparation and crippled your energies.

A reference to two or three paragraphs in your letter, will show that he is not at liberty to give a different construction to your language. You were, through me, and also at a personal interview with the President, made acquainted with his settled determination to put you in immediate command of the forces to be employed in carrying on the war with Mexico, and you had, as you state, been devoting your time and attention to preliminary and preparatory arrangements. "In the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations," you say, "I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Rio Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that necessary work, to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger, (ill will, or precondemation,) in my rear, before advancing upon the public enemy. Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed, nay, *crippled* in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to say I fear no other danger."

This language scarcely requires a comment. That it conveys the strongest suspicion, not to say a direct imputation of most unworthy motives in the Executive Government—of bad faith towards yourself—of a reckless disregard of the interests of the country—of a design to carry on a war against you when you were sent forth to carry on a war against the public enemy, there can be, I think, no question. You must allow me to advert to the only fact to which you allude as the foundation for such grave imputations. You have learned, you say, from me, that much impatience is felt, perhaps in high quarters, that you are not already put in route for the Rio Grande, &c.

What was said on this point at our interview, when this subject was alluded to, is not so fully stated as it ought to be, considering the purposes to which you have converted it. * * * * * * I did not deem it improper, indeed, considered it a matter of duty to communicate to the general, to whom the President had freely confided the management of the war, his views and expectations upon this point. That this communication, made in the manner it was, should not have been kindly received, is surprising to me, but vastly more so is the fact that it should be made the basis of the most offensive imputations against the Executive government which had voluntarily selected you to conduct our army, and determined to put at your disposal the amplest means it could command to ensure victory, and to bring the war to a successful and speedy termination. It was also a matter of unfeigned surprise to me, that you should have attributed to the President the intention of opening a fire upon your rear, while a fire in front was opened upon you by the enemy. On what foundation could such an assumption rest? Had not the President, in a frank and friendly spirit, just intrusted you with a command on which the glory and interest of the country depended, to say nothing of the success of his own administration? How could you under these circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and suffer your energies to be crippled, for the purpose of indulging in illiberal imputations against the man who had just bestowed upon you the highest mark of his confidence.

Entertaining, as it is most evident you do, the opinion that such are the motives and designs of the Executive towards you, and declaring it to be your explicit meaning that "you do not desire to place yourself in the most

perilous of all positions"—"a *fire upon* your rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans," and so entertaining them without cause, or even the shadow of justification, the President would be wanting in his duty to the country, if he were to presist in his determination of impos g upon you the command of the army in the war against Mexico. He would probably misunderstand the object you had in view in writing the letter, and disappoint your expectations, if he did not believe that it was intended to effect a change of his purpose in this respect. I am, therefore, directed by him to say that you will be continued in your present position here, and will devote your efforts to making arrangements and preparations for the early and vigorous prosecution of hostilities against Mexico.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY.

MAJ. GEN. SCOTT,
Commanding General."

General Scott found that he had miscalculated his own importance and the humility of the administration. He consented to take on himself the submissive part, and denied his own meaning to flatter one whom he meant to intimidate.

General Scott to the Secretary of War.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 25, 1846.

SIR: Your letter of this date, received at about 6 p. m., as I sat down to take a hasty plate of soup, demands a prompt reply.

You have taken four days to reflect and to convict me upon my letter to you of the 21st instant, of official, perhaps personal disrespect to the constitutional commander-in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

If you have succeeded in imparting that impression to the President, then by the conclusion of your letter, written in his behalf, I am placed under very high obligations to his magnanimity—may I not add, *to his kindness*?—in not placing me instantly in arrest, and before a general court martial. I may then hope that the President saw no such intended disrespect; and I can assure you both that I feel too great a deference to the laws and constitution of my country to offer or to design an indignity to our Chief Magistrate.

The strongest passages in my condemned letter are, I think, hypothetical. In it I spoke of "impatience"—perhaps in "high quarters;" of, "perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to;" of the infinite importance of securing myself against danger *(ill will or precondemnation)* in my rear;" and that "most perilous of all positions," to any commander—"a fire upon [his] rear from Washington and the fire in front from the Mexicans." And I also spoke of the necessity of the active, candid and steady support of [such commander's] Government, in the hope of conciliating it.

Now if there be any offence to the President in these passages—the intention of committing which I utterly disclaim—it must, in candor, be found in the meaning of the passages "high quarters," and "the quarters alluded to," which qualify all the others quoted by you.

It will be perceived that I spoke not of the *highest quarter*, but in the plural, "high quarters," and I beg, as an act of justice, no less to myself than the President, to say, I meant "impatience" and even "pre condemnation" on your part, and the known open an violent condemnation of me on the part of several leading friends and supposed confidants of the President in the two Houses of Congress (high quarters;) because, on an intimation—not an order—I did not fly to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the invading army yet to be raised—nay, abandoning it to get to that river as it could, and without the least regard to the honorable pride and distinction of the gallant general already in command on that river; who we knew had done well, was doing well, and who, I was quite sure, and his little army, would, if the occasion offered, cover themselves with glory. My prediction in this respect has been fully accomplished.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Whether it shall be the pleasure of the President to send me to the Rio Grande (which I should prefer) or to retain me here, I can only say, I am equally ready to do my duty in either position, with all my zeal and all my ability.

In great haste, I have the honor to remain, &c.,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY, *Secretary of War.*

The Secretary of War to Gen. Scott.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
June 2, 1846.

SIR:—When I received your letter of the 27th ultimo, it was my intention to answer it at some length, and to note the misapprehensions under which you are still laboring, but on account of my official engagements at this particular juncture, and not wishing to protract this correspondence, which can end in no practical good, I have changed my purpose, preferring to point out those misapprehensions in a personal interview, if you should desire it.

Your communications have all been laid before the President, but I have received no instructions to change or modify the directions contained in the closing paragraph of my letter of the 25th ultimo.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. L. MARCY.

Major General W. SCOTT.

So Scott swallowed with his "hasty plate of soup" all his insolent insinuations, and still a disappointment followed. He denies altogether Mr. Marcy's interpretation of his letter, and says (if the President entertains it,) "*I am placed under very high obligations to his magnanimity, may I not add kindness? in not placing me instantly in arrest and before a court martial. I may then hope that the President saw no such intended disrespect, and I can assure you both, that I feel too great deference to the Constitution and laws of the country to offer or design an indignity to our Chief Magistrate.*"

"*The strongest passages in my condemned letter are, I think, hypothetical. In it I spoke of impatience, perhaps, in high quarters—of perhaps utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to—of the infinite importance of securing myself against danger (ill will or precondemnation) in my rear, and of that "most perilous of all positions," to any commander, "a fire in his rear from Washington and the fire in front from the Mexicans." And I also spoke of the necessity of the active, candid and steady support of such commander's government in the hope of conciliating it.*"

After denying that in this he intended any offence to the President, he puts in this special plea to prove it. He says:

"*It will be perceived that I spoke not of the highest quarter, but in the plural, high quarters; and I beg, as an act of justice no less to myself than to the President to say, I meant impatience and even precondemnation on your part and the known open and violent denunciation of me on the part of several leading friends and supposed confidants of the President in the two Houses of Congress*"—(*high quarters;*) *because on an intimation—not an order—I did not fly to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the invading army, yet to be raised—nay, abandoning it to get to that river as it could, and without the least regard to the honorable pride and distinction of the gallant General already in command on that river; who, we knew had done well, was doing well, and who, I was quite sure, and his little army would, if the occasion offered, cover themselves with glory. My prediction in this respect has been fully accomplished.*"

After this special pleading, this version of his attack upon the President and Secretary, he tries to make all go smooth by pouring out this unction in conclusion: "*You speak of my interview with the President on the subject of the intended formidable invasion of Mexico. I wish I had time to do justice to my recollection of the President's excellent sense, military comprehension, patience and courtesies in these interviews. I have since spoke of the ad-*

mirable qualities he displayed on these occasions, with honor as far as it was in my power to do him honor." And then he turns to Mr. Marcy: "*And to you, sir, allow me to say that I have not accused you, and that I do not mean to accuse you, of a set purpose to discredit me as the commander at first designed for the new army that is to invade Mexico I bear in mind with pleasure, the many personal courtesies that I have for long years received at your hands. But I have for many days believed that you have allowed yourself to be influenced against me by the clamor of some of the friends to whom I have alluded.*"

All this after thought putting his insinuations against the Government, to the account of "*several leading friends and supposed confidants of the President in both houses of Congress,*" is contradicted not only by the whole scope of the first letter, but by its words. He says, expressly after alluding "*to the condemnation of all other persons,*" that the person in command can have "*no other reliance (in his absence) than the active, candid and steady support of his Government.*" And it was simply because he had no confidence in the support of his Government that he refused to go to Mexico, until he had sent all the troops and supplies he wanted before him to Mexico. It is apparent then that it was not the condemnation of "leading friends and supposed confidants" that he cared for. It was because he would have no reliance on the support of Government, the Departments, the high quarters, where the power resided to support him, that he felt himself at liberty to say: "*I am too old a soldier and have too much special experience not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger, (ill will or pre-condemnation,) in my rear, before advancing upon the public enemy.*" With this explicit declaration to the Secretary, that he meant to secure himself and not trust the administration, how poor is the *come off*, that he alluded to "friends and confidants," but did not mean to insinuate that it was from such high quarters as head quarters itself, that he expected "the fire in his rear from Washington;" and yet with its support he feared nothing!

Mr. Marcy answered this letter of adulation as cooly as the other, and in effect says, without saying it, "*I admit what the gentleman says, out of compliment; however, I do not believe him.*"

Gen. Scott has another elaborate reply to this note of Mr. Marcy, in which is this begging passage:

"I still hope when the President shall have read that explanatory letter (the 'hasty plate of soup' letter) and the foregoing exposition of facts, attentively, he may be willing to recur to his original purpose and award to my senior rank the preference I have never ceased to entertain, and which I would have pressed with incessant zeal, but for the apprehensions heretofore expressed, and which your letter has nearly, if not quite, removed. I therefore *beg* to claim that command whenever the President may deem it proper to give me the assignment, whether to day or at any other better time he may be pleased to designate."

To this, Mr. Marcy answered briefly:

"Your communications have all been laid before the President, but I have received no instructions to change or modify the directions contained in the closing paragraph of my letter of the 25th ult."

General Taylor's movement on Monterey rendered General Scott distressingly restive, and he addressed the Secretary of War in a plaintive missive, shewing that he no longer insisted on having his own time or his own way, and that he had been some three months in that obedient mood.

On the 12th of September, 1846, he reminds the Secretary that on the 27th of May last, he had requested that he might be sent to take the immediate command of the principal army against Mexico, "either to day or at any better time the President may choose to designate." And he adds, 'Should the President yield to my wishes, a few hours in New York and Philadelphia will enable me to make certain arrangements and save the necessity of a return to those cities from Washington. I suppose it would be easy for me to reach the Rio Grande by the end of the month." To this eager solicitation the Secretary replies, that the President "requests me to inform you that it is not within the arrangements for conducting the campaign, to supersede General Taylor in his present command by assigning you to it."

On the 18th of November, the President supposing General Scott really contrite, gave him the order "*to repair to Mexico to take the command of the forces there assembled and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition on the Gulf Coast.*"

Scott's Manœuvres against Gen. Taylor.

After getting the plenary authority over the forces in Mexico, General Scott, knowing that General Taylor had taken Monterey and had advanced to Saltillo while Santa Anna was gathering his army at San Luis, perceived at once that the position occupied by each of the belligerents presented a strong temptation to bring on a struggle between them at one point or the other.—If Taylor could defeat Santa Anna and take San Luis, the way to the city of Mexico would be opened to him. If Santa Anna could vanquish Taylor at Saltillo, it would put his line on the Rio Grande in his power. Scott foresaw that the weakening of Taylor's force at Saltillo must bring down upon that point the army which had been drawn together to oppose him, and which before Wool joined him, had already threatened him with an attack. To let Taylor remain in strength to receive and defeat his antagonist, and to pursue his victory, Scott saw was to give his rival, Taylor, the power to enter the city of Mexico, and put an end to the war. This had been the route on which it was at first contemplated to march to the conquest of the city of Mexico.—The difficulty of crossing the desert, and after being worn out by the march, to defeat Santa Anna with a superior army, alone restrained Taylor from pursuing that plan which, he wrote to the Secretary, he only wanted adequate means to execute. This was the posture of things when Scott arrived at the Rio Grande.

General Taylor had been consulted several times by the Secretary of War, about the Gulf expedition; at first, as if it would be committed to him; and it was inquired, what force could be spared from that which he carried up the Rio Grande for that purpose, while maintaining

a proper attitude in the country conquered by him. In a letter of Oct. 15th, 1846, from Monterey, he gives this account of his strength: "*I am satisfied*, 500 men *per regiment would be a large average of effectives among the volunteers. This would give, including the cavalry, a force little short of* 9,000 *men, or adding* 4,000 *regulars, (our present strength is not* 3,000,) *a total force of* 13,000. *Leaving the very moderate number of* 3,000 *to secure our rear, I could not be able to march from Saltillo with present and expected means at the head of more than* 10,000 *men.*"

This was Taylor's army, and the question was, how much of this force could be safely taken to act on the Gulf, (say Tampico or Vera Cruz,) giving up the plan of moving upon the city of Mexico by San Luis. On this point, General Taylor says. "*In the latter case the general line of the Sierra Madre might very well be taken, but even then with the enemy in force on my front, it might be imprudent to detach to Tampico (this was the point of embarkation for Vera Cruz) so large a force as* 3,000 *or* 4000, *particularly of the description required for that operation.*"

Again recurring to the projected expedition to Vera Cruz, on the 12th of November, while he supposed he was himself to command, (Scott was not appointed until the 18th of November, and Taylor did not know it until late in December,) he says: "*A force of* 10,000 *men cannot be spared from the occupation of the line of the Sierra Madre. Four thousand may be directed to that object [Vera Cruz] and if to these, six thousand fresh troops from the United States were added at the proper time, the expedition might be undertaken with a promise of success.*"

Here the matter was simply and plainly laid down to the government by a General who had never failed in a promise or an undertaking.—With Santa Anna looking from San Luis, with eager eye on the line of the Sierra Madre, to break it at some weak point and destroy the communication on the Rio Grande—the consequence being the loss of all that had been gained—Taylor would not, to crown himself with laurels in the city of Mexico, detach more than 4,000 men from that line. But what does Scott do on superseding Taylor? He runs up to Camargo, and in the absence of Taylor, who, without being apprised of Scott's coming, had marched to Victoria with "*a desire*" (as he tells Scott) *to place in position for embarkation to Vera Cruz, should the government order an expedition to that point, the force* (2,000 *regulars, and* 2,000 *volunteers) which I reported might be spared for that service.*" Instead of being satisfied with the number which Taylor thought sufficient for himself, with the troops coming from the United States, Scott seized the occasion, without consulting Taylor, and without regarding his statements to the Secretary of War, to strip him of almost his whole army. Here is Scott's requisition made through General Butler, who commanded at Monterey, Taylor being at Victoria, to communicate in that direction with the Gulf.

Scott says to Butler: (January 3, 1847:)

"*You will, therefore, without waiting to hear from General Taylor, and without the least unnecessary delay, in order that they may be in time as above put in movement for the mouth of the Rio Grande, the following troops —about* 500 *regular cavalry of 1st and 2d regiments of dragoons, including Lt. Col. Kearney's troop—about* 500 *volunteer cavalry. I rely on you to select the best—two field batteries of regular light artillery, say Duncan's and Taylor's, and* 4,000 *regulars on foot, including artillery acting as infantry—the whole under Brevet Brigadier Gen'l Worth, about this time, no doubt, a Major General by brevet, and assigned to duty according to the latter rank.*

In addition, put in movement for the same point of embarkation, [the Brazos] and to be there as above 4,000 *volunteer infantry.*"

When Taylor was informed of Scott's movement, he returned to Monterey, and although little addicted to complaining, he addressed him this letter.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
Camp near Montery, [Victoria,]
Jan. 15, 1847.

SIR:—In a communication addressed this day to your Staff officer, I have replied to so much of your letter, of the 6th inst., and its enclosures, as relates to points of detail; but there are other and grave topics embraced in those communications, to which I deem it my right and my duty to reply directly.

The amount of force to be withdrawn from this frontier and the manner in which it is proposed to withdraw it, had never fully come to my knowledge until yesterday, though hinted at in your note of November 25th. Had you, general, relieved me at once in the whole command, and assigned me to duty under your orders, or allowed me to retire from the field, be assured that no complaint would have been heard from me. But whilst almost every man of my regular force, and half the volunteers (now in respectable discipline,) are withdrawn for distant service, it seems that I am expected, with less than a thousand regulars and a volunteer force, partly of new levies, to hold a defensive line, while a large army of more than 20,000 is in my front.

I speak only of a defensive line, for the idea of assuming offensive operations in the direction of San Luis, by March or even May, with such troops as can then be at my disposition, is quite too preposterous to be entertained for a moment. After all that I have written to the Department on the subject of such operations, I find it difficult to believe, that I am seriously expected to undertake them, with the extraordinary limited means placed at my disposal.

I cannot misunderstand the object of the arrangements indicated in your letters. I feel that I have lost the confidence of the Government, or it would not have suffered me to remain up to this time ignorant of its intentions, when so vitally affecting interests committed to my charge. But however much I may feel personally mortified and outraged at the course pursued, unprecedented at least in our own history, I will carry out in good faith while I remain in Mexico, the views of the government, though I may be sacrificed in the effort.

I deeply regret to find in your letter of January 3, to Major General Butler and myself, an allusion to my position here, which I cannot but consider as an insinuation that I have put myself willingly out of the reach of your communications. I beg leave to remark that the movement of the troops in this direction, and my own march hither, were undertaken for public reasons, fully set forth in my reports to the Adjutant General; one of them being my desire to place in position for embarkation to Vera Cruz, should the government order an expedition to that point, the force (2,000 regulars and 2,000 volunteers,) which I reported might be spared for that service.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant.
Z. TAYLOR,
Major General U. S. A., Commanding.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army, Brazos, Texas.

But it was not merely the quantum of force taken from him, but the manner of taking it, which appeared in the sequel to have had the

effect of weakening Taylor, and of exposing him with less than 5,000 men to the attack of Santa Anna's 20,000. Scott took regiments from Taylor, having three months to serve, and could not, therefore, be expected to serve throughout the campaign in the heart of Mexico, and supplied their place consequently, by others that would have served had he retained them, throughout the war—the whole effect of which was to expose Taylor (whether designed or not) to Santa Anna's blow at Buena Vista, without either. He took from Taylor the Georgia, Kentucky and Alabama volunteers, the 3d and 4th Illinois, the 1st and 2d Tennessee foot regiments, and Tennessee cavalry. He sent to him the Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana regiments in return. The five regiments taken from Taylor had too short a time to serve to reach the battle-field of the city of Mexico, where the war was to be decided; and in fact he sent them home from Puebla, and awaited the arrival of the other troops from the United States, which he might have taken with him to make his march on the city of Mexico. The consequence of taking the regiments named from Taylor, was to reduce his force to less than 5,000 men to meet Santa Anna with 20,000, before the troops sent in exchange for them would reach him. Why did Scott take Taylor's volunteer regiments from him at such a crisis, and under such circumstances, putting them on their march down on the Rio Grande, sending the Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana, North Carolina and Mississippi, from his force up the river to replace them at the vast expense of a double transportation of two small armies? Was there such a superiority in the volunteers under Taylor, over those of the States last mentioned, that he felt compelled to reject the one and take the other at whatever cost? Let it be remembered that the regiments sent to Taylor were to serve during the war; those taken from him had only three months to serve, the former, if Scott had retained them, would have accompanied him to the city of Mexico; the latter he was obliged to discharge, and was compelled as he admits, to await the arrival of other troops from the United States, to supply their places, giving Santa Anna time to recover his troops from their successive defeats, and to organize a new force for the defence of the city? Why did Scott lay the foundation of his own complaints, by sending away from him troops for the war on the way to Mexico, and some of them already advanced to Lobos, to justify the withdrawal from Taylor of those having only three months to serve? No man can look into another's breast but through his character, and Scott's notorious envy and jealousy of every rival, and the fact that he was at the moment, entering on a race with Taylor in competition for the Presidency, to whom Palo Alto and Monterey had given the start, furnishes a clue to his motives. When Scott's order for the winnowing of Taylor's remnant of force by taking the volunteers (the regulars having been already demanded) was about to be executed, Colonel Duncan predicted that Santa Anna (who lay at San Luis between the city of Mexico and Buena Vista) would seize the occasion to attack and overwhelm Taylor. What the accomplished Duncan foresaw and pronounced would be inevitable, was apprehended by many even at Washington. It is not possible that the probability of such a result could escape the forecast of Scott, who had made it the study of his life, to anticipate what effect the movement of one body of troops would produce in the conduct of the enemy, opposed to them. Scott could not shut his eyes upon the certainty, that the reduction of Taylor's force to less than 5,000 men would bring upon him Santa Anna's 20,000 that lay between him and the city of Mexico, to defend it from his approach. The nation knows how truly the result answered all military calculations. While Scott was effecting his unnecessary exchange of one body of State troops for another of volunteers in Taylor's diminished army—while the latter was stripped of a large portion of his temporary troops as well as regulars, and before those exchanged for them had arrived, he was assailed by Santa Anna, with an overwhelming force and saved from utter distruction by his own obstinate valor and the chivalrous courage of his handful of troops. If Taylor had been defeated all the glories of the Mexican war would have been in reserve for Scott. The ardor of his countrymen would have been up, and revenge and patriotism would alike have rallied under Scott's banner, to seek an expiation in the heart of Mexico. But Santa Anna failed and barely failed at Buena Vista. Scott's strategy however did not fail there. If Taylor had retained his regiments which were idly made by Scott to paddle down the Rio Grande, while others in exchange were made as idly to paddle up the Rio Grande, leaving Buena Vista to be maintained by the fragment of an army, the consequences of that field would have been what Scott may have apprehended—the utter overthrow of Santa Anna, and the march of Taylor by the direct route on Mexico.

Scott renews the attack on "high quarters."

But after Scott had established his army in the heart of Mexico—had met Santa Anna with his troops, broken and dispirited by their overthrow at Buena Vista—had tried them and found that they could not resist our strong, daring, indomitable soldiers, and now being secure in scattering the disorganized forces of the enemy and capturing the capitol, his jealous feeling turned towards those who might, by directing the councils, providing the means, and sharing the responsibility attending the conquest, be entitled to a participation in its glory. From that moment Scott renewed the warfare against those "in high quarters," from whom, he had a little while before, begged quarter. He looked with an evil eye upon the commanding power at Washington, and although in the midst of a rich country, in which success put everything in his power, his complaints were incessant against all the Departments at Washington, however indefatigable they had been in providing men, money and materi-

al—everything indeed to ensure a triumph, on which the fate of the administration depended.—His dispatches were calculated to make the impression that he derived no support from the Government at home—that all his hopes were disappointed, and that he was really suffering what he said in his letter "after a hasty plate of soup," he had reason to apprehend. In this way he artfully prepared, in case of unexpected disaster, to throw the whole blame on the Department at Washington, and in case of entire success, to appropriate all the honors to himself. He was still looking for the Whig nomination to the Presidency, of which Harrison's good fortune had deprived him in 1840, and therefore, for his own sake and the sake of his party, he was doubly anxious to depress the democratic administration. For this reason his despatches were filled with complaints; but at last a startling cause made them burst out in open contumacy to the authority which had been weak enough after his first insolence to intrust him with the conduct of its forces.

The President sent Mr. Trist with overtures of peace to Mexico, which he was directed to deliver to General Scott, to be forwarded, and to remain with the Army as a commissioner to sign the treaty, provided the treaty proposed to Mexico should be assented to. This produced a paroxysm in General Scott, for he had determined that the Government at Washington should have neither the credit of directing the war nor of concluding the peace. The force placed at his disposal by the Executive put Mexico in his power, and he was resolved that no treaty of peace should rescue it until he had accomplished the object of his own ambition in dictating terms in the city of Mexico. He even demurred to allow our Government to send propositions for a treaty through Mr. Trist to the Government of Mexico. He says to that gentleman in a letter dated May 7, 1847:—

"Senor Amaya is, I believe, President ad interim. But you may have learned that Congress, after hearing of the affair at Cerro Gordo, passed many violent decrees, breathing war to the uttermost against the United States; declaring that the executive has no power, and shall have none, to conclude a treaty, or even an armistice with the United States, and denouncing as a traitor any Mexican functionary who shall entertain either proposition. I have communicated a copy of those decrees to the War Department, and until further orders thereupon, or until a change of circumstances, I very much doubt, whether I can so far commit the honor of my Government, as to take any direct agency in forwarding the sealed despatch you have sent me from the Secretary of State of the United States.

"On this delicate point, however, you will do as you please; and when, if able, I shall have advanced near the Capital, I may, at your instance, lend an escort to your flag of truce; and it may require a large fighting detachment to protect even a flag of truce against the rancheros and banditti, who now infest the national road, all the way up to the Capital.

"I see that the Secretary of War proposes to degrade me, by requiring that I, the commander of this army, shall defer to you, the chief clerk of the Department of State, the question of continuing or discontinuing hostilities.

"I beg to say to him and to you, that here in the heart of a hostile country, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impossible to withdraw the army without a loss probably, of half its numbers by the *vomito*, which army, from necessity must soon become a *self sustaining machine*, cut off from all supplies and reinforcements from home, until perhaps, late in November—not to speak of the bad faith of the Government and people of Mexico—I say, in reference to those critical circumstances, this army must take *military* security for its own safety. Hence, the question of an armistice or no armistice is most peculiarly a *military* question, appertaining of necessity, if not of universal right, in the absence of direct instructions, to the commander of the invading forces: consequently, if you are not clothed with military rank over me, as well as with diplomatic functions, I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that, in your negotiations, if the enemy shall entertain your overtures, you refer that question to me, and all the securities belonging to it. The safety of this army demands no less, and I am responsible for that safety until duly superseded or recalled. Indeed, from the nature of the case, if the enemy, on your petition, should be willing to concede an armistice, he would, no doubt, demand the military guaranty of my signature for his own safety.

Should you, under the exposition of circumstances I have given, visit the moveable head quarters of this army, I shall receive you with the respect due to a functionary of my government; but whether you would find me here, or at Perote, Puebla, or elsewhere, depends on events changeable at every moment.

"The sealed despatch from the Department of State, I suppose you desire me to hold until your arrival, or until I shall hear further from you.

"I am, Sir, respectfully your obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT."

On the 31st of May, 1847, Mr. Marcy wrote to General Scott as follows:

"It is an unpleasant duty to advert, as I feel constrained to do, to your letter of the 17th instant, and more particularly to a copy of one of the same date, therewith enclosed, addressed by you to Mr. Trist. With me it is a matter of sincere regret that a letter of such an extraordinary character was sent to that gentleman; and I cannot doubt it will be no less regretted by yourself on more reflection, and better information. Such information you would have received had Mr. Trist delivered in person, as I had no doubt he would, my letter to you of the 14th instant, [ultimo,] with the despatch from the State Department to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations. My letter would have secured you from the strange mistake into which you have fallen, by regarding him as the bearer of that despatch to the Mexican Government, and yourself called on to aid in transmitting it. Had such been the true state of the case, I cannot perceive that you would have had any just ground of complaint, or any sufficient excuse for withholding the assistance required; but by looking at my letter, you will discover your misapprehension. Mr. Trist was the bearer of that despatch to yourself—not to the Mexican Government, and when he had delivered it into your hands, his agency ceased; he had no discretion or judgment to exercise in regard to sending on or withholding it. This was a matter committed solely to yourself. I refer to the language of my letter to shew the entire correctness of this view of the subject. "You will transmit that despatch to the commander of the Mexican forces, with a request that it may be laid before his Government, at the same time, giving information that Mr. Trist, an officer from our Department for foreign affairs, next in rank to its chief, is at your head-quarters, or on board the squadron, as the case may be.' This is a positive instruction to yourself to send that despatch forward; and it is expected you will have acted upon it without waiting for the arrival of Mr. Trist at your head-quarters, if thereby any unnecessary delay was likely to result.

"My letter informed you that Mr. Trist was "clothed with diplomatic powers"" and his instructions and the project of treaty which he carried with him, have ere this apprized you that he is a commissioner with full powers to negotiate a peace. The treaty which he was authorized to conclude, contains an article, as you will have perceived, which provides for a suspension of hostilities, but not until after the treaty shall have been ratified by the Mexican Government. Neither the considerations of humanity nor sound policy would justify the continuance of active military operations, after a treaty of peace had been concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico, until the information of that fact could be communicated from Mexico to this place, and an order for the suspension of hostilities hence transmitted to the commanding general in that country. It will not be questioned that a commissioner of peace may be properly vested with the power of agreeing to a suspension of hostilties in a definitive treaty, negotiated and already ratified by one party, while waiting the ratification of the other. As the negotiator is the first to know the fact, that a treaty has been concluded and so ratified, it is beyond dispute, proper that he should be directed to communicate the knowledge of that fact to the commanding General: and it cannot, in my view of the case, be derogatory to that officer, to be placed under

instructions to act with reference to that fact, when duly notified of it by the Commissioner. The case cannot be made plainer, or your misapprehensions in regard to it more clearly pointed out, than by simply stating it as it must exist, if the contingency should fortunately happen, on which you will be required to suspend hostilities. A Commissioner of peace is sent by the President to your head-quarters, and he makes known to you his authority to receive from Mexico offers for concluding a peace. You are informed by his instructions, and the projét of a treaty which he is required to exhibit to you, that on the conclusion and ratification of a treaty of peace by Mexico, hostilities immediately thereafter are to cease. With all these facts fully made known to you in advance, you are directed by the President to suspend hostilities, on receiving written notice from the Commissioner that the contingency—the conclusion and ratification of a treaty of peace by Mexico—has happened. Under these circumstances, can you conceive that, as commanding General of the force in Mexico, you have the right to raise a question upon your duty to obey this direction, coming as it does through a proper channel, from your superior—the Commander-in-chief? In my opinion, you could not have wandered farther from the true view of the case, than by supposing that the President or myself has placed you in the condition of deferring "to the chief clerk of the Department of State, the question of continuing or discontinuing hostilities." I cannot conceive that any well-founded exception can be taken to the order you have received in relation to suspending hostilities; and I am fully persuaded, that if the contingency requiring you to act upon it shall ever occur, you will promptly carry it into full effect.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War."

Maj. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT.

The letter written to Mr. Trist was intended for and sent immediately to the Secretary. In it will be found a gratuitous fling at Commodore Perry who had sent Lieutenant Semmes of the navy to Head Quarters, with a view of being forwarded by Gen. Scott to the city of Mexico, to make proper representations to save the life of Lieut. Rogers, who was taken prisoner by the Mexicans, and whose life was threatened as a spy. He was incensed at Col. Wilson for detaching a guard from Vera Cruz to protect Lieut. Semmes and was provoked also that the commissioner Mr. Trist, should have been assisted in reaching Head Quarters, although he had the authority of the President to command the necessary means of reaching his destination. But after offering this indirect insult, through Mr. Trist, to the Department at Washington, Commodore Perry and Lieut. Semmes, General Scott in conversation with Lieut. Semmes yielded to his application and consented to put him in communication with the Mexican authorities, or least forward his despatches. Yet such was his repugnance to the President's having access by an agent to the city of Mexico, that he revoked his promise; whereupon Lieut. Semmes addressed him this note:

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Jalapa, May 8, 1847.

"General: I understood you to say in the conversation I had the honor to hold with you on the evening of my arrival at this place, that although you had no escort then at your command, with which to forward me to the city of Mexico, in the execution of my mission, I might continue with the army in its progress, and that when you should reach some convenient point near the city, you would either put me in personal communication with the Government, or send forward my despatches.

"I have this morning, been waited upon by Lieutenant Williams, your aid-de-camp, who informs me in your behalf, that you have changed your resolution on this point, and that you will not permit me to hold any intercourse with the Mexican government.

"Commodore Perry has been charged by the President of the United States, to make a communication to the Government of Mexico, with the nature of which you have been made acquainted. He has selected me to carry out the views of the President, and has directed me to apply to you for the means of executing his orders.

"With regard to the question, as to who is the proper channel through which this communication is to be made, I can, of course, have nothing to say; that must be settled by higher authority; but the President has thought proper to judge of this for himself, and I am here by authority (immediately) of one of the Departments of the Government, as his humble agent. I have specific orders from my Commander-in-chief to place personally, with your assistance, my despatches in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Relations; or, if the Mexican Government will not permit me to proceed to the Capital, in person, to forward it by some safe conveyance, and await an answer. My object in addressing you this note, is to inquire, whether I understand you as deciding that you will not, at your convenience, afford me the facilities requested of you by Commodore Perry, to enable me to proceed on my mission, and that you will not permit me to hold any intercourse, personal or otherwise, with the Mexican Government. If this be your decision, as a military man, you must see the propriety of giving it to me in writing, in order that I may exhibit it to my Commander-in-chief, as a sufficient reason for failing to execute his orders; as soon as I receive this, I shall hold myself in readiness to return to the squadron by the first conveyance.

I enclose for your inspection, my order in the premises, from Commodore Perry, together with a copy of the despatch of that officer to the Mexican government, from which you will be able to see that my mission cannot have in the remotest degree, any bearing upon your military operations. I will be obliged to you if you will return me these papers after perusal.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. SEMMES.
Lieut. U. S. Navy.

Major Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Com'g the Armies of the United States.

To which the General returned a captious answer; and after a rigmarole of what he, the General, had and would have done for Lieut. Rogers concludes thus:

General Scott to Lieut. Semmes.

"I regret that Commodore Perry has thought it necessary to send you as his special messenger to treat with the Mexican government on the subject of Mr. Rogers, even if I had been ignorant of the capture and position of the passed midshipman, a note from the commodore would have been sufficient to have interested me officially and personally in his fate, and I doubt the expediency of more than one channel of communication with the Mexican government on such subjects.

"But there is at hand, another functionary, who under very recent instructions from the President of the United States, may perhaps, claim to supersede me in the business of exchanging prisoners of war, as on other military arrangements. Mr. Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State, appointed minister or commissioner to Mexico, has arrived at Vera Cruz, and may be at this place with the train expected in a few days. Perhaps you had better refer the business of your mission to him. I only make the suggestion.

"The difficulty of sending forward a flag of truce at this time with communications to the Mexican government, if there be a competent government any where, consists in the necessity of protecting the flag, by a large escort, against rancheros or banditti who infest the road all the way to the Capital, and who rob and murder even Mexican officers returning on their parole to their friends.

"When nearer to the Capital, some time hence, I may nevertheless have occasion to communicate officially, under the cover of a flag and a heavy escort, with any body that may be then in authority on the subject of prisoners of war generally. Your communication and any that Mr. Trist may desire to submit, may go by the same opportunity. In the mean time you can remain here, return to Commodore Perry's squadron, or advance with the army, as may seem to you best. I have no advice to offer on the subject.

* * * * * * * * * * *

"With high personal respect, I remain yours, truly,

WINFIELD SCOTT."

Lieut. R. SEMMES,
U. S. Navy, &c.

The heart of every man who feels for the dignity of his Government must sicken to see the humiliation to which Scott subjects the Presi-

dent's agents—the one sent to negotiate a peace, the other to protect the life of a gallant officer, threatened with the gallows, and charged as a spy—from which ignominious charge it was the object of this mission of a naval officer to acquit him, as being acquainted with all the circumstances that implicated him. But General Scott was not done with Mr. Trist. That functionary, who was the grandson-in-law of Jefferson, had been his private Secretary—the private Secretary of General Jackson—consul at Havana, under Mr. Van Buren—the first officer under Mr. Buchanan in the State Department—a man of unblemished character, kind manners and finished education, felt it due to himself as well as the station he was sent to occupy—of commissioner to treat of peace—the representative of the President, with his terms and instructions in his pocket, to demand a compliance on the part of the General with the President's orders. He did so in an elaborate letter which General Scott treats with scorn. To this the General sends the following reply:

General Scott to Mr. Trist.

"Head Quarters of the Army,
"*Puebla, May* 29, 1847.

"Sir: Your long studied letters of the 9th and 20th instant, making thirty pages, in reply to my short note of the 7th, were handed to me under one cover at Jalapa, the morning of the 21st, when you knew, being on the spot, that I was about to march upon this place. Occupied as I was with business of much higher importance, I did not allow the seal of the package to be broken till the evening of the 22d, which I took care to have done in the presence of many staff officers. One of them at my instance, read apart and reported to me the general character of the papers. I have not yet read them.

"My first impulse was to return the farrago of insolence, conceit and arrogance, to the author; but on reflection, I have determined to preserve the letters as a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners. The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the field, a more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you were but armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just, all in one.

"You tell me that you are authorized to negotiate a treaty of peace with the enemy, a declaration which, as it rests upon your own word, I might well question; and you add, that it was not intended at Washington, that I should have any thing to do with the negotiation. This I can well believe, and certainly have cause to be thankful to the President for not degrading me by placing me in any joint commission with you.

"From the letter of the Secretary of War to me, of the 14th ultimo, I had supposed you to be simply authorized to propose or concede to the enemy, the truce or armistice which usually precedes negotiations for a peace; and my letter to you was written on that supposition. If the terms of military conventions are left to me, the commander of this army, I have nothing more to desire or to demand for its safety.

"In conclusion—for many persons here believe that the enemy 20,000 strong, is about to attack this place—I have only time to ask you in your future communications to me, to be brief and purely official; for if you dare to use the style of orders and instructions again, or to indulge yourself in a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw back the communication with the contempt and scorn which you merit at my hands."

"I remain, sir, officially, &c.,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

To Nicholas P. Trist, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

A true copy,
GEO. W. RAINS,
Lieutenant and Acting Aid de Camp."

When the Government at Washington saw, from the course of Genl. Scott towards Mr. Trist, that as far as the influence of the Commander-in-Chief could accomplish it, the commissioner would be stript of all respect in our own army, and if allowed to communicate with the Mexican administration at all, would want its support, it was concluded to recall Mr. Trist, and to send the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Sevier, of the United States Senate, to manage the affair of the Treaty. General Scott had, however, by this time, become convinced, that having thus humbled Mr. Trist by his tyrannical abuse of the arbitrary will he exerted in Mexico, it would not be good policy to repeat the experiment upon more exalted civilians who might be sent to his army. It might not suit his ulterior presidential aims, and he therefore resolved that he would change his course towards Mr. Trist, and by forwarding his object and assuming the lion's part in the business, appropriate the honors of both the war and peace-making power. So from brutal insult and oppression, he suddenly transformed his conduct to bland and conciliatory kindness. Two months after he had communicated his letter, making poor Mr. Trist blend in himself, Danton, Marat, and St. Just, and an ambulatory guillotine, he writes the following charming account of Mr. Trist and of the "happy change" in their relations:—

General Scott to the Secretary of War.

"Head Quarters of the Army,
Puebla, July 25, 1847.

"Sir: My last report was dated the 14th ultimo, from this place, enclosing a copy of my instructions (June 3) to Col. Childs, ordering up the garrison of Jalapa, and a copy of a letter from me to Mr. Trist, of May 29.

"Although daily in expectation of something of special interest to communicate, nothing has occurred of that character, save a happy change in my relations, both official and private, with Mr. Trist. Since about the 26th ultimo, our intercourse has been frequent and cordial; and I have found him able, discreet, courteous and amiable. At home, it so chanced that we had but the slightest possible acquaintance with each other. Hence more or less of reciprocal prejudice, and of the existence of his feelings towards me, I knew (by private letters) before we met, that at least a part of the Cabinet had full intimation.

"Still the pronounced misunderstanding between Mr. Trist and myself could not have occurred but for other circumstances: 1st, his being obliged to send forward your letter of April 14th, instead of delivering it in person with the explanatory papers which he desired to communicate; 2d, His bad health in May and June, which, I am happy to say has now become good; and 3d, The extreme mystification into which your letter, and particularly an interlineation, unavoidably threw me.

"So far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing that all I have heretofore written to the Department about Mr. Trist, should be suppressed. I make this declaration as due to my present esteem for that gentleman; but ask no favor and desire none at the hands of the Department. Justice to myself, however tardy, I shall take care to have done.

* * * * * * * * * *

"You will perceive that I am aware, (as I have long been) of the dangers which hang over me at home: but I too, am a citizen of the United States, and well know the obligations imposed under all circumstances by an enlightened patriotism.

"Having, June 3d, lost all hope of being joined by other troops than the nine hundred and odd men belonging to the old regiments of this army, and of whose approach I had had notice from the Adjutant General, I ordered up Col. Childs with the garrison from Jalapa; but instructed him to wait for that body, and any other (I was thinking only of some other parties of recruits,) he might chance

to hear of. He waited first, for Col. McIntosh; next for Brigadier General Cadwalader, who in turn, heard of and waited for Major General Pillow. The latter arrived here with all those detachments, the 8th instant. But in the meantime, I had heard, that Brigadier General Pierce had reached Vera Cruz on the 28th June, and was to take up his line of march at the latest, the 3d instant. Consequently I expected him here with much confidence by the 17th, but the day before, I learned with great disappointment that the want of transportation and an accident would detain him at Vera Cruz till the 16th—of course I cannot now look for him before the end of this month. I shall be obliged to wait his certain and near approach; 1st, because we need the strong reinforcement he will bring up; and 2d, the money supposed to be with him is indispensable.

"In respect to money, I beg again to report, that the chief commissary (Capt. Grayson,) of this army has not received a dollar from the United States since we landed at Vera Cruz, March 9.

* * * * * * * * * *

"I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War."

It will be observed that although Scott had relented entirely as regarded Mr. Trist, yet he had not at all relaxed in animosity to the administration. He would have "no favor and desired none from the department." Although Mr. Trist was "*able, discreet, courteous, and amiable,*" and he had taken him entirely into his confidence and could apologise for him touching their "pronounced misunderstanding," yet he did not intend to pardon the Executive for sending him to make a peace at his expense. No, no. "Justice to myself, however tardy, I shall take care to have done."

What a misfortune it was to Genl. Scott, that Genl. Jackson had not been at the head of the administration while he headed the army. Neither the hasty plate of soup letter, nor any of the supercilious notes dishonoring the chief magistracy of our country, would have been indited by him. Genl. Jackson had given Genl. Scott an early lesson on the subject of wielding a loose tongue, and a later one on that of wielding a loose pen. The first has already been noticed—the last occurred while Genls. Scott and Jesup were engaged together in the Creek war. Scott's jealousy was roused about some successful movement of Jesup, and he began a wrangling correspondence in consequence. The moment the Secretary of War (Mr. Cass) brought the letters to the notice of the President, Scott was recalled—Scott had rendered himself obnoxious to many citizens of Florida, who had burned his effigy, and his immediate recall was earnestly demanded by Mr. White, the delegate, in a letter addressed to the President.

After settling the affair with Mr. Trist to his satisfaction, Gen. Scott next showed his contumacy to his Government, by declining to let it have even a scrap of official intelligence. In October, the Secretary writes:

"SIR:—*No official dispatch has been received from you at this Department of a later date than that of the 4th of June, though we are not without authentic information of your operations to the 20th of August.*"

Not a syllable would he write, and we shall see presently, that he undertook to punish the most distinguished officers in his army, for allowing the people of the United States and government to get "the authentic information" of which the Secretary speaks, through other channels. Another letter of similar import reminded the General that the Government had a right to know from him what the army was doing and intended to do. In vain. The whole summer and part of the fall was suffered to pass, after his defiance of the Government in regard to its commissioner. This was not less to mark his contempt for the civil authorities of his country, than to shew, that he meant to carry out the threat of his first letter repulsing Mr. Trist, and the authority that sent him, that of making his army independent.

"I beg to say to him [the Secretary of War] and to you, Mr. Trist, that here in the heart of a hostile country, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impossible to withdraw this army, without a loss probably of one half its numbers by the vomito, which army from necessity must soon become a *self sustaining machine*, cut off from all supplies and reinforcements, from home, until, perhaps, late in November, not to speak of the bad faith of the Government and people of Mexico—I say in reference to these critical circumstances, *this army must take military security for its own safety.*"

This was the ground upon which he put his refusal in May, to allow Mr. Trist to carry out the orders of his government, to make a treaty of peace upon the terms he was authorized to offer, and to make an armistice after they were ratified by Mexico.

"I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that, in your negotiations, if the enemy should entertain your overtures, you refer that question to me, and all the securities belonging to it."

The army then, was to become "*a self sustaining machine,*" by denying the authority of the President of the United States to enter into an armistice, and he took effectual measures to prevent it, by refusing an escort for the Commissoner to the Mexican Capital. But no sooner had he found that Mr. Trist was recalled, and the Attorney General and Senator Sevier were deputed in his place, than he himself made an armistice in advance to invite a treaty, instead of making the war until the treaty was stipulated; and he thus enabled Santa Anna, while he suspended the war, to make fresh preparations for defence, and this deceptive truce cost the lives of multitudes of our brave men, who could have marched into the defenceless city, after the battle of Churubusco, without storming those strong holds, Molino del Rey and Chapultepec, which the armistice gave Santa Anna time to arm and fill with troops. If the Government had proposed to do what Scott did, to make an armistice before a treaty, and had so exposed and sacrificed such a hecatomb of patriotic officers and soldiers, there would have been some pretext for the opposition of the General, though even then no justification for his mutiny against orders of the Chief Magistrate, the Commander-in-Chief. Gen'l Scott had not only the audacity and indiscretion thus to invert the orders of the Government, contained in Mr. Trist's instructions—by grasping at a treaty through a truce made most destructive to his army, but he afterwards prosecuted his purpose through Mr. Trist, after he knew

he was recalled by the Government, and the negotiation committed to other hands. This was carrying out his design, which is apparent in all his correspondence from the moment he felt that circumstances put him beyond recall—that of denying to the administration any credit for making the war or the peace. Being in the saddle at the head of the army, in the heart of Mexico, in the midst of a campaign which had cost the administration so much to provide for, he knew it would not take the risk of arresting the movements of the army by changing the commander, nor risk the mischief of the insubordination to which he shewed such a tendency, and which might throw impediments in the way of a successor.

Scott's War on those who fought his Battles in Mexico.

The war over, Genl. Scott's next concern was to take all the glory of the achievement from the officers who had most distinguished themselves, and stood in positions at home likely to bring them forward for the civil honors of the government. Pillow was in Genl. Jackson's State—a State commanding great influence in the south-west—was greatly favored by the then President,—was a lawyer of some eminence,—had been under fire in all the battles from Vera Cruz to Mexico,—was twice severely wounded, and had been lucky in some manœuvres made by him on his own responsibility. Scott, who had been but little exposed to the enemy's fire, during the whole Mexican war, had his jealousy aroused by the lucky shots Pillow had received as well as by his lucky hits as a General, at Contreras and Chapultepec. Hence his quarrel with General Pillow, and attempt to disgrace him by a trial before a court of enquiry.

Worth was a son of the Empire State,—was Scott's Aid in the battle of Lundy's Lane,—was distinguished for his gallantry and the wounds received in that battle,—had gathered fresh laurels in Florida, and with Genl. Taylor soon after his first battles in Mexico, covering himself with glory for skill as well as bravery at Monterey,—had been the Marshall Ney of the army in its bloodiest fight—the Molino del Rey,—and had opened the gates of the city of Mexico to Genl. Scott, on the day of the fall of Chapultepec. This was enough to draw down on him the envy of Genl. Scott and an attempt to disgrace him.

Duncan and his famous Battery of Cannon, now kept at the arsenal at Washington, in its battered condition, as the proudest relic of the war with Mexico, had won at Palo Alto, Resaca and Monterey, so much renown,—had, from Vera Cruz until he fought the way for both Worth's and Quitman's columns into the gates of the city of Mexico, so nobly redeemed, under Scott, the promise created under Taylor,—had, with such triumphs, become so identified with the feelings of his country, that the Genl. could not brook the eclat with which the American press re-echoed the peals of Duncan and his battery. Besides, Duncan, when Scott had taken his measures to march upon the city of Mexico, by the way of Mexicalciengo, under the impression, from his reconnoisances, that the way round Chalco was impassable, had set him right by his own better reconnoissances. In carrying Mexicalcingo, "the attacking troops, (an officer accompanying them says,) would be confined to the breadth of the road, and in their advance for three-fourths of a mile, receiving the raking and cross fire of many guns in seven or eight separate batteries embanked and built on a marsh, the road being a causeway through the marsh to the fortress." "From such a battle," continues the narrative of the officer, published recently in the Democratic Review, "we believe Col. Duncan saved the American army. He said to Genl. Worth, instead of examining the Mexican guides and spies, why not examine the road? Genl. Worth fully concurring with him, ordered the reconnoisance, and then sent Col. Duncan to report its results to the General-in-Chief at Ayotla, with a letter strongly advising the movement of the whole army by the Chalco route. The whole country is aware of the brilliant results of this movement." The private history of this transaction,—of Pillow's successful manœuvre at Contreras, and storm of Chapultepec,—of Worth's bloody victory at Molino del Rey, would, if told, show the cause of Scott's jealousy and of the persecution of the distinguished officers to which he addressed himself when the war was over. The case of Molino del Rey was striking. Scott took it for a cannon foundry. If it had been, it could not make cannon to do mischief in the assault of Mexico, which was to take place in a few days. It was in fact a fortified mill. It was urged that it was of no use when taken, and yet in spite of remonstrances to this effect, he persisted, like Don Quixotte, in the attack on the mill, but he found it, instead of a house filled with machinery and materials for manufactures of any sort, a terrible military cover, concealing an army, like the Trojan Horse. Worth took it at the cost of nearly a thousand men, and it was immediately abandoned as a worthless conquest. This blunder of the General which brought glory only to the immolated troops and their daring leader, provoked deep indignation in the obstinate man, who felt a deep censure in a simple relation of the facts,—unjustly ascribing their promulgation in the United States, as well as the notices of the approach to Mexico, and the affair of Contreras, to the persons distinguished by the events, he published this general order :—

"Head Quarters of the Army,
Mexico, Nov. 12, 1847.

"General Orders, No. 349.

"The attention of certain officers of this army is recalled to the foregoing regulation, which the General-in chief is resolved to enforce so far as it may be in his power.

"As yet, but two echoes from home, of the brilliant operations of our arms, in this basin, have reached us—the first in a New Orleans, and the second through a Tampico newspaper.

"It requires not a little charity to believe that the principal heroes of the scandalous letters alluded to, did not write them, or especially procure them to be written, and the intelligent can be at no loss in conjecturing the authors—chiefs, partizans, and pet familiars. To the honor of the service, the disease—pruriency of fame, *not* earned—

cannot have seized upon half a dozen officers, (present) all of whom, it is believed, belong to the same two coteries.

"False on dit may, no doubt, be obtained at home, by such despicable, self puffing and malignant exclusion of others; but at the expense of the just esteem and consideration of all honorable officers who love their country, their profession and the truth of history. The indignation of the great number of the latter class cannot fail, in the end, to bring down the conceited and the envious to their proper level.

By command of Major Gen. Scott,
H. L. SCOTT,
A. A. A. G."

But Scott was not satisfied with this expression of his feelings. He arrested these officers, resolved to bring them to trial before a military court to degrade them. The result of the court of enquiry, in the case of Pillow, was positive proof, that he did not write the letter extolling his conduct in the newspapers referred to by Scott, and positive proof that the movement on the village, which put Contreras in the power of our army, and decided the fall of that point of defence, was made by Pillow, and that Scott knew nothing of it, until he saw from a distant height, the troops in motion, and learned from Pillow the object they were sent to attain, which Scott approved, but had no right to claim as he did, the honor of originating. His attempt against Pillow was therefore foiled.

The result as to Duncan was a voluntary abandonment of his charges on the part of Scott before the court.

The character of the charge against General Worth and its fate will be found in the following extract from a letter of the Secretary at War to General Scott:

The Secretary of War to General Scott.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
January, 13, 1848.

Sir: Since I addressed you on the 14th of December, the following communications have been received, viz: Your despatches, Nos. 30, 3[illegible], 37, 38, 39, copy of the correspondence between yourself and Commodore Shubrick, his letter of the 16th of November, and yours in reply, of the 2d of December, and copies of charges and specifications against Major General Pillow, Brevet Major General Worth, and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Duncan.

The perusal of these communications by the President has forced upon his mind the painful conviction that there exists a state of things, at the head-quarters of the army, which is exceedingly detrimental to the public service, and imperiously calls upon him to interpose in such a way as will, he sincerely hopes, arrest and put an end to the feuds and dissensions which there prevail.

After the fullest consideration of the subject, the President has not been able to give his approval to the course you have adopted towards Brevet Major General Worth; and, for reasons which I will briefly state, he defers for the present, at least, to order a court martial for his trial on the charge you have presented against him. The documents show that General Worth felt deeply aggrieved by your "general order No. 349." Imputations of a very serious character were by that order cast upon some of the officers under your immediate command, and from its peculiar phraseology, it was understood by Gen. Worth, or others, as indicating him as one of the officers obnoxious to the severe censure and reproof therein contained. With this view of the import and object of the order, his attempt by all proper means to remove from himself the ignominy of these imputations, cannot be regarded as an exceptionable course on his part. As the stroke which had, as he thought, deeply wounded his honor as an officer and his character as a man, come from your hands, his application for redress was properly made to you, but as he did not obtain such redress, as he believed, under the circumstances of the case was due to him, he exercised or attempted to exercise the right of appeal to superior authority. If he was actually aggrieved in this matter or believed himself to be so, he had an unquestionable right to have the subject brought to the consideration of his and your common superior, the President of the United States. He prepared charges against you, (for his letter of the 16th of November, to the Secretary of War can be viewed in no other character,) and endeavored to send them though you, the only channel he could use without violating established regulations, to his common superior. For the matter contained in these charges against yourself, you have made a charge against him, forwarded it to the President, and asked for his trial by a court martial. If the course of proceeding which you propose in this case is sanctioned and carried out, you cannot but perceive that the precedent will be most fatal to the essential rights of all subordinate officers. If General Worth has been guilty of an offence by preparing and attempting to transmit charges against you to the President, for wrongs and injuries alleged to have been inflicted by you on him, it seems to be a necessary consequence that, whatever may be the character of the wrongs and injuries inflicted upon subordinate officers by their superiors, they cannot seek redress by appeal without being involved in a military offence. Whatever may be the injustice they suffer, the hope of remedy by appeal would be illusory, and the right to appeal worse than valueless, if, by the mere statement of their complaint, whether in the form of charges or otherwise, for the action of a common superior, they would be liable to be arrested and tried before any investigation had been made of the truth or falsity of the matters therein set forth, and even before the appeal had reached the authority which alone could afford redress. Such a principle as this would in its practical operations, subvert justice and withhold protection from subordinate officers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. L. MARCY.

Maj. Gen. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. army, Mexico.

The frivolous pretext on which Scott put Worth under arrest, and called for a court martial, was, evidently, not the true motive for this indignity, and that contained in the General Order 349, above quoted. His real provocation grew out of a letter Worth addressed to him, some time before, which estopped the General-in-Chief in an effort he made to depreciate his service and success in the taking the City of Mexico, and previously at Molino del Rey—Worth's letter and General Scott's endorsement leave nothing for comment.

Worth's Letter.

CITY OF MEXICO, *Dec.* 29, 1847.

Sir: In the official report of the capture of the city of Mexico, dated September 18, 1847," republished in the "Star," newspaper, and which I had an opportunity of seeing, yesterday, for the first time, the following paragraph occurs:

"Within those disgarnished works I found our troops engaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, at windows, and on house tops, all flat, with parapets. Worth ordered forward the mounted howitzers of Cadwalader's brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers, and pickaxes and crowbars to force windows and doors, or to burrow through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of position fatal to the enemy. By 8 o'clock in the evening, Worth had carried two batteries in the suburbs. According to my instructions he here posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but one more obstacle, the San Cosme gate, (custom house,) between him and the great square in front of the Cathedral and palace—the heart of the city, and that barrier it was known could not, by daylight, resist our seige guns thirty minutes.

"I had gone back to the foot of Chapultepec, the point from which the two aqueducts begin to diverge, some hours earlier, in order to be near the dépôt, and in easy communication with Quitman and Twiggs as well as with Worth."

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the general-in-chief, that he has entirely misconceived the facts of the case. Passing by, for the present, several errors in the report. I proceed to invite his attention to the marked sentences. They read thus:" "By 8 o'clock in the evening Worth had carried two batteries in the suburbs." "According to my instructions, he here (that is in the suburbs) posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night." "There was but one more obstacle, the San Cosme gate, (custom house,) between him and the great square in front of the Cathedral and palace," On these sentences, marked in the quoted printed paragraph annexed, I have to observe,

1st. That my command was not halted and sheltered for the night in the suburbs, nor did I receive instructions to that effect.

2d. That before six o'clock my command had carried "the gate, or custom house, of San Cosme," captured the cannon which defended it, and turned upon the flying enemy.

3d. That one of my brigades quartered, that night, several hundred yards within the gate, and my head-quarters with it; the pickets and patrols being advanced to a Church, where the 6th infantry now quarters, more than half way from the gate San Cosme to the Alameda; the other, and Ridgely's brigade quartered for convenience *at* and *by* the gate.

The night position of my troops was in the knowledge of two officers of general head-quarter's staff, and it is, or was within the knowledge of other officers of the staff that by 8 o'clock heavy guns, a mortar, and 24-pounder, were got up from the far rear, and before nine opened upon the great plaza, said guns being in battery "at the San Cosme gate," the firing of which brought out (as was averred by them at the time) the Commissioners who reached my night quarters, some two hundred yards *within* that "one more obstacle," at half-past one, a. m., and it was from thence I passed them, in charge of an officer of my staff to the general-in chief, whom I supposed to be near Chapultepec, but who was found at Tacubaya. I am aware that the *picture* referred to in the official gives a wrong position to my troops. Aside from my own official report which was before the general, his own staff could have convicted the picture of error.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. J. WORTH.
Brevet Maj. Gen.

Endorsement.

Respectfully forwarded:

I might animadvert justly and severely upon the tone of the within, and upon several of its assertions; but will under the circumstances, say that I committed an error in saying, in my report, that the gate of San Cosme was not passed by Worth's division in the evening of the 13th of September. That gate was the second battery carried by the division, and I gave the division credit for having passed *two*.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

January, 1848.

It would extend this documentary Memoir too much, to introduce all the vindictive feuds which General Scott provoked with the officers of the Mexican campaign. General Jesup, General Marshall, Col. Harney, Capt. Montgomery, and a multitude of subordinates are involved in the general letter of crimination at the close of the war, levelled at the President and Secretary—and it is made a grievous offence in them, that they did not give way to the violent and oppressive temper, which required General Taylor to be stript of the remnant of the officers left with him to confront Santa Anna, to form court martials, to try those in Scott's army, with whom he had quarrelled. Mr. Marcy in reply to the complaint justly says, in his last letter to General Scott: "*Subsequent events have proved, that it was most fortunate the President did not comply with your request—for had he done so, some of the officers highest in rank and most conspicuous at Buena Vista, might at that critical conjuncture have been separated from their commands, and engaged in a court at a distance from that glorious scene of action.*" The Secretary concludes his remarks on this point by observing to General Scott, that "*no man has more reason than yourself to rejoice that no order emanated from Washington, though requested by you, which would have further impaired the efficiency of Gen. Taylor's command in the crisis that then awaited him*"—and the matter which would have made Gen. Scott particularly answerable for the absence of the officers, is previously given in these words "Had the court been composed of officers taken from General Taylor's command, it would still further have weakened his condition, already weak in consequence of the very large force *which you* (Gen. Scott) *had withdrawn from him.*" This is a pregnant fact, for it shows that what General Taylor had attributed to the Government in regard to stripping him of such a *large force*, was Scott's, not the Cabinet's act.

This whole letter and that of Scott containing his impeachment of the administration ought to be read now by the nation—Scott's was prepared for this very occasion. It is an attempt throughout to derogate from the Democratic Government which waged the war—to appropriate to himself all the results of the mighty risk which the Democratic party encountered in declaring it—of the blood which its citizen-soldiers poured out to maintain in it the cause of their country—and carry all with him into the ranks of the whigs, invoking them, as a return, to crown him with the Presidency. He has succeeded so far as to put down Fillmore, Webster, and Crittenden—the men of ability and renown, as party leaders. They were opposed to the declaration of the war—Scott begged and pressed himself into it—and now by the utmost bitterness and vindictiveness against those who indulged his participation, he gets with his own party the advantage of those eminent men, who hazarded everything to maintain its policy, while he betrayed it. Having profited by the employment solicited from a Democratic administration, he betrays that too—cries out that he is a persecuted man after it has given him all he asked or could wish, and with an effrontery, well exposed by Mr. Marcy, charges upon it his own misconduct in its service, and even denounces it for conceding to him what he proposed in his own behalf. Marcy's reply to Scott's accusations were so overwhelming that he never attempted to controvert either its statements or arguments. This correspondence has been largely circulated recently. It is barely necessary to refer to it as a part of Scott's life recorded by his own pen.

Such has been Scott's career as a public man—an officer in the army for 45 years. His military life has nothing in it like that of Washington, Jackson, or Harrison. These men grew up and were educated among citizens and equals—Scott began life in command of a company of Regulars, a rank and file accustomed to black his boots and dress his horse and walk in silence in his presence, touching their caps with the fore finger. It was in this school that he acquired the habit of indulging an overbearing, arrogant, insolent temper—a temper prone to disregard the appearance of consistency of principle or of conduct—and not over-scrupulous in preserving consistency even in statements of facts. The result is, a character which may manage a regular soldiery embodied as a "*self sustaining machine*"—but is not one to be trusted with the management of the civil concerns of a free people. In his letter accepting the Whig nomination to the Presidency, he speaks of obedience as the "*one principle of military conduct*" which is to characterise his Presidential authority. This is a striking para-

graph in the last revelation he has made of himself to the public:

*"Convinced that harmony or good will between the different quarters of our broad country is essential to the present and future interests of the Republic, and with a devotion to those interests that can know no South no North, I should neither countenance nor tolerate any sedition, disorder, faction, or resistance to the law, or the Union, on any pretext in any part of the land; and I should carry into the civil administration this one principle of military conduct—obedience to the legislative and judicial departments of Government, each in its constitutional sphere—*saving only, in respect to the Legislature, the possible resort to the veto power—always to be most cautiously exercised, and under the strictest restraints and necessities."

He will not "tolerate any sedition, disorder, faction or resistance to the law or the Union in any part of the land." The elder John Adams had a law passed by Congress against "sedition, disorder, faction," &c. &c., but that law was repealed long since, because it was found that our countrymen being sometimes a seditious, disorderly, factious people, must be tolerated in those manifestations which more or less characterize popular liberty every where, and which when too severely repressed break out into revolution or sink down into slavery. It is evident from the context, that Gen. Scott's mind was directed to the troubles growing out of the sectional question in our country, and his edict in advance that he would "know no north and no south, and would tolerate no sedition, disorder, faction or resistance to law," was but preliminary warning, that "he would carry into civil administration this one principle of military conduct—obedience to the legislative and judicial Departments of Government," with the promptitude of a regular bred officer. His course in Mexico shows that he will execute this pronunciamiento. He has meditated well the time and the mode of applying his "one principle of military conduct" to the seditious disorder, faction or resistance to law on the part of abolitionists in the north, or State rights men in the south.—That he is resolved not to tolerate the irregular and unlawful conduct which he has already so distinctly branded with his displeasure is clear, and it is equally clear that he relies on his military scholarship to furnish the remedy. It is the European plan of dealing with sedition—our country had a taste of it under the first federal ruler, who blended both of General Scott's favorite political ideas in his famous alien and sedition laws—the one to rid the country of aliens, the other of sedition, by force. General Scott has exhibited his theory as to aliens in various lights, and he has given one striking example of his mode of execution—and we may gather from it how he would manage the sedition and faction north and south which he is resolved not to tolerate. With the avowal contained in his several letters on these topics, and his deliberate declaration in favor of a national Bank and of a national Bankrupt law—the one to build up a gigantic monied power, the other hordes of privileged speculators to uphold it—there is little doubt but that a regular bred military man at the head of the government might make short shrift for any troublesome factions that annoyed him.

W46

WERT
BOOKBINDING
Grantville, Pa
Jan - Feb 1989
We're Quality Bound